

IMPLEMENTING PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (I): CENTRAL AFRICA

Africa Report N°181 – 7 November 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	i
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. SECURITY COOPERATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE.....	2
A. THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INSECURITY	2
B. SLOW ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.....	4
C. THE START OF REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5
D. TOWARDS A REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE	7
III. ECCAS: THE SUM OF ITS PARTS.....	9
A. A CENTRALISED INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TOOL.....	9
B. UNBALANCED INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION	10
C. INCONSISTENT FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBER STATES	12
D. MANY INITIATIVES BUT POOR RESULTS.....	12
1. MICOPAX 1: A mission near its end	12
2. The Gulf of Guinea: A new subregional security initiative	14
3. The other programs: The arduous preparation of thematic policies	15
E. THE GEOPOLITICS OF DISTRUST AND THE ABSENCE OF REGIONAL LEADERSHIP	16
IV. A CONFUSED WEB OF PARTNERSHIPS	18
A. COMPETITION FROM BILATERAL FRIENDSHIPS	18
B. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON REGIONAL SECURITY.....	18
C. A WEAK EXTERNAL PROFILE AND MINIMAL COORDINATION	20
V. TIME FOR DECISIONS.....	21
A. STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF STATES AND RAISING ECCAS'S PROFILE	21
B. REFORM ECCAS	22
1. Simplifying the decision-making system.....	22
2. Improving internal governance	22
C. RATIONALISING PRIORITIES AND ACQUIRING COORDINATION CAPACITY	23
VI. CONCLUSION	24
APPENDICES	
A. MAP OF ECCAS COUNTRIES	25
B. MAP OF ECCAS TERRITORIAL WATERS.....	26
C. GDP AND POPULATION OF ECCAS COUNTRIES	27
D. REGIONAL COMMUNITIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA	28
E. ECCAS ORGANIGRAM	29
F. DIHPSS ORGANIGRAM	30
G. CHRONOLOGY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA	31
H. ACRONYMS.....	33
I. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP	34
J. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2008.....	35
K. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.....	37

IMPLEMENTING PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (I): CENTRAL AFRICA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Political and security cooperation in Central Africa is in urgent need of revival. More than a decade ago, the African Union (AU) tasked the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to breathe life into its peace and security architecture. ECCAS member states signed relevant treaties and protocols, but the multinational body has struggled to shape and implement a regional policy. To ensure this conflict-prone region moves toward greater political integration, Central African states need to reinvigorate ECCAS, reform it and decide on clear security priorities. Foreign partners should coordinate their support to the organisation in line with its needs, absorption capacity and objectives.

The spiral of conflict that set Central Africa on fire in the 1990s made painfully clear the need for a regional political and security response. With the double blessing of the AU and the European Union (EU), ECCAS committed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict in the region. Unfortunately, like previous efforts to promote economic integration, political and security cooperation has not produced the hoped-for results.

On paper, ECCAS looks good. Central African states signed a mutual assistance pact and a protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Afrique centrale, COPAX). They also set up a Regional Staff Headquarters (Etat-major régional, EMR) that runs multinational military training exercises and the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique, MICOPAX). But in reality, regional leaders have been reluctant to create and invest in an institution that constrains the way they cooperate in security matters. They voice support to a regional peace and security architecture, but half-heartedly commit to ECCAS while turning more readily to old and trusted bilateral relations to mitigate their security concerns, thus generating a confused web of partnerships.

ECCAS suffers from serious internal governance problems. Decisions on in-house issues are highly centralised and have to be made by consensus among member states. Instead

of generating cohesion among regional actors, this means sensitive issues on which member states differ are avoided. It is also an institution still under construction. Human resource management is a constant problem, as is the body's financial dependence on outside backers.

Only decisive political commitment by its members can breathe new life into ECCAS. But the successive postponement of the heads of state summit and the failure of members to appoint representatives in some of its organs reveal a lack of interest in the organisation's purpose. Members' distrust of each other, ingrained by a violent past, and the absence of regional leadership also drain ECCAS of its usefulness. As a result, the most serious security problems are dealt with outside the ECCAS framework, and Central Africa's peace and security architecture has difficulty leaving the drawing board.

The region's governments should urgently deepen their political commitment to ECCAS's structures and projects and sort out their common priorities. They must decide if they really want to be members of ECCAS. If so, they should prove their will by undertaking several crucial steps: respect their financial obligations to the organisation; name their representatives to it; and organise a summit as soon as possible. A reform agenda should focus on the decision-making system, ensuring smooth running of the secretariat in Libreville and greater involvement of civil society. Security priorities should seek practical implementation and concrete results.

Foreign partners should establish effective coordination, tailor their support to ECCAS's peace and security priorities and adjust it to the organisation's absorption capacity. The first major goal is to strengthen the secretariat so it can implement its programs and avoid overspending and duplicating efforts.

In the next few years, the fundamental challenge is to give political meaning to an organisation whose members exist in a tangle of mistrust, rivalries and thinly veiled hostility. If this zero-sum geopolitics endures, Central African countries will continue to put their own narrow inter-

ests above the project of peace and security architecture. Political and security integration would then risk following in the tragic footsteps of economic cooperation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To reinforce political commitment and to reform ECCAS

To Member States:

1. Undertake a cost/benefit evaluation of participation in ECCAS and, based on this, decide to stay or leave.
2. Organise quickly a heads of state summit aimed at publicly launching a reform agenda, deciding the thorny question of the nomination rule for senior positions and naming a new secretary general.
3. Decide the priorities of ECCAS's peace and security policy and annually make the work plan public.
4. Pay membership dues to ECCAS regularly (contribution communautaire d'intégration) and apply sanctions on those who do not pay, as set out in the ECCAS Constitutive Treaty.
5. Designate representatives to the committee of ambassadors and to the deputy secretary general posts, as well as in each member state a high-ranking civil servant to act as liaison with ECCAS.
6. Include ECCAS in processes aimed at resolving political and border disputes between member states.
7. Evaluate the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) and prepare an exit strategy with a clear timeframe.
8. Revise the Constitutive Treaty to adopt decision-making by majority for administration and management issues; introduce emergency procedures and simplified consultation; and delegate some aspects of the decision-making to the Council of Ministers and the Defence and Security Commission.
9. Ensure balance between the civilian and military components of the Regional Staff Headquarters (Etat-major regional, EMR) and reaffirm the superiority of the Department for Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability (Département de l'intégration humaine, de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité, DIHPSS) over it.
10. Organise joint communication campaigns involving the ECCAS general secretariat and national authorities to make plain ECCAS's role and functions to the general public.
11. Revise the COPAX Protocol to conform to the Constitutive Act of the African Union and to increase civil society involvement.

To improve the running of the secretariat

To the ECCAS Secretariat:

12. Establish the subsidiarity principle as a basic rule of internal management.
13. Recruit new staff through transparent procedures, taking into account the need for member states to be represented and for new personnel to be experienced in project management.
14. Update ECCAS's financial regulation and create new salary levels to attract qualified candidates.
15. Increase the means and privileges of the human resource department.
16. Increase financial control by introducing annual audits, the results of which are made public and that are followed up, as necessary, with sanctions.
17. Provide the DIHPSS with a coordination desk.

To increase the effectiveness of donor support

To foreign partners, in particular the EU, France and the U.S.:

18. Coordinate support within the Group of Friends of ECCAS, which should be enlarged to include current and prospective partners.
19. Make support proportional to ECCAS's absorption capacity and align it to the organisation's peace and security priorities and the need to strengthen the secretariat.

Nairobi/Brussels, 7 November 2011

IMPLEMENTING PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (I): CENTRAL AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

At the start of the 1990s, a wide-ranging revival of the regional integration project took place in Africa. This revival gave a formal boost to numerous regional organisations that were dormant and sought to make them strategic instruments to promote development and stability. Current thinking on how best to achieve this objective involves associating economic and political dimensions by giving regional organisations that historically have had an economic objective, a role in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

Central Africa followed this movement by reforming its two main integration organisations. The Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), which grouped six states¹ was dissolved in 1994 and replaced by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). Later on, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), created in 1983 and grouping the six CEMAC states and five others,² was awoken from its lethargy in 1998. With the creation, in February 1998, of the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX) and the signing of a mutual assistance pact in February 2000, ECCAS was transformed into a political and security forum while maintaining its original mandate of economic integration.

ECCAS was chosen to manage the peace and security architecture in Central Africa at a time when the region was the theatre of a continental war. Despite, or rather because of the conflicts, the role of CEMAC and ECCAS took shape over the years. The first regional peacekeeping mission was launched on 25 October 2002 with the Multinational Force in Central Africa (FOMUC) and ECCAS gradually established peacekeeping and security arrangements within the framework of the continental architecture created by the African Union (AU).

However, Central Africa's peace and security architecture has run out of steam and looks like an unfinished construction. The inertia emanating from the regional geopolitical situation, national selfishness and external factors makes cooperation problematic. These factors need to be analysed in order to assess the progress made by Central African countries and the extent of the obstacles they still need to overcome in order to make ECCAS an effective manager of political and security crises. This new Crisis Group report conducts such an assessment and examines the initiatives undertaken by ECCAS since it was relaunched in 1998. This is the first of a series of reports that analyse the regional dimension of insecurity in Africa and the collective and individual responses to this issue.

¹ Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad.

² Angola, Burundi, Rwanda (which later withdrew), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and São Tomé and Príncipe.

II. SECURITY COOPERATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Ever since independence, the regional dimension of insecurity in Central Africa has continually reminded governments of the need to cooperate on security issues and to build institutions able to support and facilitate such a joint enterprise. However, the trust between states has been continuously eroded by recurring conflicts and competition. It was only in the mid-1990s that economic and political conditions matured sufficiently to relaunch ECCAS and make it a permanent though not unique vehicle for collective security initiatives.

A. THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INSECURITY

Insecurity in Central Africa has most often taken the form of conflicts between different ethnic groups for control of the state. Decolonisation resulted in weak but highly centralised governments, unwilling or unable to win the support of a population that was politically, socially and culturally divided rather than united around a common project to build a nation-state.³ Many leaders concentrated the state's power and resources in the hands of their own ethnic group while their opponents took up arms.⁴

³ Specialists emphasise different causes when explaining why the nation-state has not taken root in Africa. Some argue that this model did not suit African societies because of the diversity of people within their territories. See Bertrand Badie, *L'Etat importé : l'occidentalisation de l'ordre politique* (Paris, 1992). Others show how the combination of traditional power structures and practices and the colonial heritage led leaders to privatise the state in order to accumulate personal wealth. See J-F Ménard, "L'Etat néopatrimonial en Afrique noire", in Ménard, *Etats d'Afrique noire : formations, mécanismes et crises* (Paris, 1991) and Jean-François Bayart, *La greffe de l'Etat, les trajectoires du politique* (Paris, 1996).

⁴ In the period 1965-1997, Mobutu Sese Seko, president of Zaire (later the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC) concentrated power in the hands of his own group, the Ngbandi, from the province of Equateur. Chad's post-independence history has been a long succession of dictatorships, each one promoting the interests of its own ethnic group. After 1982, Hissène Habré consolidated his power with the support of the Anakaza and embarked on a process of ethnic cleansing, mainly against the Sara, Hadjerai and Zaghawa. He was overthrown by Idriss Déby in 1990, who then went on to ensure the pre-eminence of his own group, the Zaghawa. See Crisis Group Africa Report N°149, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April 2009, p. 3. In the Republic of Congo, long-standing tensions between the Mboshi (north) and the Lari and Nzabi (south) led to civil war. Sassou Nguesso recruited his supporters from among the Mboshi, his own ethnic group, while

Numerous battles for control of the state quickly assumed a regional dimension following the involvement, wanted or not, of external actors. For Central African states, loosely controlled borders, cross-border ethnic allegiances and antagonisms, ideological affinities and the unequal distribution of natural resources are reason enough to interfere in the internal wars of their neighbours. These factors transform simple conflicts between neighbouring countries into political and security risks and justify helping allies to acquire and safeguard material gains. Governments have therefore frequently provided financial, logistic and military support to one or more of their neighbours' opponents, thereby linking civil wars.

During the civil war in Angola (1975-2002), the Republic of Congo,⁵ in communist solidarity, supported the party in power since independence, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA).⁶ At the same time, Mobutu Sese Seko, an ally of the West and then president of Zaire, supported two rebel groups: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA). Having over a long period developed links with FNLA leaders, he wanted to see a friendly government in power in his southern neighbour, with whom he shared a long border. He therefore became a willing intermediary for American support to the anti-communist rebels. His involvement also ensured that Angola's rough diamonds were sold by Zaire businessmen connected to the regime.⁷

This patchwork of alliances and antagonisms between Zaire and Angola explains why UNITA troops fought alongside the Congolese army against Laurent-Désiré Kabila's rebels and why Eduardo Dos Santos's Angolan government took up Kabila's cause and later supported his son, Joseph Kabila, when they in turn came to power.⁸

Pascal Lissouba and Bernard Kolelas did the same among their own ethnic groups in the south. Paul Biya, president of Cameroon since 1982, has always promoted the interests of the Beti, although he has succeeded in avoiding open conflict with other groups. See Crisis Group Africa Report N°161, *Cameroon: The dangers of a Fracturing Regime*, 24 June 2010, p. 2.

⁵ The Republic of Congo is the official name of Congo-Brazzaville, not to be confused with its immense neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Congo-Kinshasa.

⁶ Crisis Group interview, ministry of foreign affairs official, Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, 8 March 2011.

⁷ Christian Dietrich, "UNITA's mining and exporting capacity", in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds.), *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds* (Pretoria, 2000), pp. 275-294.

⁸ John F. Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (New York, 2001). Crisis Group interview, former official, Kinshasa, DRC, 9 March 2011.

During the first Congo war (November 1996-May 1997), Rwanda's Tutsi government supported the Congolese rebels against Mobutu. It saw in this support for these mainly Tutsi rebels a means of preventing Hutu attacks against Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, from their bases on the other side of the border. Barely a year after the rebel leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, took power in 1997, the second Congo war began, and became the first continental African war.⁹ This time, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola were all involved as well as Uganda and Rwanda, who decided to support factions opposing the new president. Rwanda was partly motivated by ethnic allegiances with the Banyamulenge Tutsis in the east. The Rwandan and Ugandan armies maintained a military presence in the north east of the DRC in order to profit from the trade in Congolese minerals.¹⁰

When civil war again raged in the Republic of Congo between June and October 1997, Angolan President José Eduardo Dos Santos deployed several hundred soldiers in Brazzaville, occupied the port city of Pointe-Noire and conducted operations in the south to support Sassou Nguesso against the then Congolese president, Pascal Lissouba, one of UNITA's most important foreign supporters.¹¹

Historically, states have also offered refuge, intentionally or otherwise, to opposition politicians and rebels from neighbouring countries. Having organised an uprising against Mobutu, Pierre Mulele – a rebel leader in Zaire – found refuge in the Republic of Congo after his rebellion failed in the 1960s.¹² More than 40 years later, his nephew, the former general Munene, made the same journey from the DRC to the Republic of Congo. President Sassou Nguesso still refuses to extradite him despite the insistence of the DRC authorities.¹³ Similarly, François

Bozizé, who was chief-of-staff of the Central African Republic (CAR) army at the time, found refuge in neighbouring Chad when President Ange-Félix Patassé accused him of attempting to orchestrate a coup.

The Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), have found refuge along the border with the DRC since the mid-1990s.¹⁴ The Ugandan rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) set up camp in the Garamba National Park, in north-eastern DRC, before the Ugandan army forced them to disperse into South Sudan and the CAR in September 2008.¹⁵ In August 2010, Agathon Rwasa, president of the National Liberation Forces (Forces nationales de libération, FNL) – a former Burundian Hutu armed group and later an opposition party – found refuge in eastern DRC while claiming the Burundian government tried to arrest him. From then on, he travelled constantly between the two countries.¹⁶

The immediate consequences of fighting, especially the cross-border flows of refugees, affect also the interests of neighbouring states and have contributed to the regionalisation of conflicts. The flood of Hutu refugees from Rwanda into Zaire after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 contributed to spreading the conflict to the other side of the border, as the Rwandan Tutsi soldiers chased the Hutu refugees to massacre them in their camps.¹⁷

Insecurity in Central Africa has also been perpetuated by regional problems that states are unable to deal with individually. The lucrative trade in arms, which involves both international and regional actors, has helped to fuel rebellions and criminality of all kinds. The rebels in the CAR found it easy to obtain arms across the borders with Chad and Sudan.¹⁸ Similarly, cross-border crime is an enduring threat to the security and livelihoods of civilians. In the border area between Cameroon, CAR and Chad, criminals known as road-cutters continue to endanger the lives of ci-

⁹ Gérard Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War: The "Congolese" Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa* (Oxford, 2009).

¹⁰ See the reports of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001; S/2002/565, 22 May 2002; S/2002/1156, 16 October 2002; and S/2003/1027, 23 October 2003.

¹¹ Lissouba had authorised Jonas Savimbi's UNITA to store arms on Congolese soil, allowing him to avoid having to leave arms within the reach of UN disarmament teams. UNITA also received some of its oil supplies from the Republic of Congo. "Pourquoi l'Angola avait fait la guerre au côté de Sassou Nguesso pour chasser Lissouba?", www.nerrati.net, 22 January 2010.

¹² Mulele returned to the DRC in 1968 when Mobutu promised to amnesty him. On his return, he was tortured and executed.

¹³ Crisis Group interview, ministry of defence official, Kinshasa, DRC, 9 March 2011. "La RD Congo rappelle son ambassadeur au Congo-Brazzaville", *Radio Okapi*, 25 March 2011. After the diplomatic crisis at the beginning of the year

between Brazzaville and Kinshasa, diplomatic tensions reappeared in October for the same reason: the presumed infiltration of conspirators into the DRC from Congo-Brazzaville. "Kinshasa et Brazzaville s'expliquent à propos de l'incident de Lukolela", *Radio France Internationale*, 12 October 2011.

¹⁴ See Crisis Group Africa Report N°165, *Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite Rapprochement with Rwanda*, 16 November 2010, p. 7.

¹⁵ Crisis Group Africa Report N°157, *LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony*, 28 April 2010.

¹⁶ Crisis Group Report, *Congo*, op. cit., pp. 16-17 and Crisis Group Africa Report N°169, *Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse*, 7 February 2011, p. 11.

¹⁷ "Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo", UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 2010.

¹⁸ See Eric G. Berman, Louisa N. Lombard, "The Central African Republic and Small Arms: A Regional Tinderbox", *Small Arms Survey*, December 2008.

vilians and constitute a significant brake on economic activities.¹⁹

Central African governments have been slower than those in Southern and West Africa to agree to the regionalisation of the prevention and resolution of conflicts. It is only after several decades of regional economic co-operation that they focused on the politically more delicate issue of cooperation on security matters.

B. SLOW ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Attempts at cooperation between Central African states have been hindered by geographical, economic and political obstacles.²⁰ In 1964, five newly independent countries created the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale, UDEAC).²¹ The governments of Cameroon, CAR, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad hoped to perpetuate the economic flows that France had established with its colonies and, as elsewhere in Africa, saw the creation of a customs union, a free trade area and harmonisation of external customs duties as the best way of achieving that.²² From the same perspective, in 1976, Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda created the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL).

The geography of Central Africa partly explains why two different economic communities were created and why they have found it so difficult to increase regional trade. The density of the equatorial forest has hindered the development of communications and trade routes, which has slowed down the establishment of cross-border economic and social networks.²³ The vastness of the region handicaps its geopolitical cohesion.²⁴ Cameroon is just as inclined to look west as it is to look towards Central Africa; Chad is politically and economi-

cally involved with Sudan and North Africa;²⁵ Rwanda and Burundi belong to the Great Lakes region and to East Africa; and Angola has closer economic ties with South Africa than with Central Africa.²⁶

The DRC is so vast that its foreign trade is conducted in several directions: the east is integrated into the East African economy, while the province of Katanga in the south traditionally has close ties with Southern Africa.²⁷ While simultaneous membership of states on the periphery of economic communities to the east and to the south is a rational choice,²⁸ it has weakened political and financial investment in Central Africa as a political, economic and social entity.

The 1980 Lagos Action Plan for the Economic Development of Africa envisaged greater regional integration to revitalise the continent's economic health. In this context, UDEAC's six members, CEPGL's three members and the island state of São Tomé and Príncipe formed the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on 18 October 1983.²⁹

Political and not economic interests were, however, behind this community. Omar Bongo, then president of Gabon, was jealous of the influence that Cameroonian President Paul Biya exercised in the UDEAC thanks to his country's economic weight in the region. He therefore insisted on creating a new and larger economic community in which Cameroon

¹⁹ Saibou Issa, "La prise d'otages aux confins du Cameroun, de la Centrafrique et du Tchad: une nouvelle modalité du banditisme transfrontalier", *Polis*, vol. 13, no. 1-2 (2006), pp. 119-146.

²⁰ Béatrice Hibou, "Contradictions de l'intégration régionale en Afrique centrale", *Politique africaine*, no. 54 (1994), pp. 66-73.

²¹ The union became active two years later and Equatorial Guinea joined in 1983.

²² See Bruno Békolo-Ebé, "L'intégration régionale en Afrique: caractéristiques, contraintes et perspectives", *Mondes en développement*, no. 115-116 (2001/3), pp. 81-88.

²³ Conversely, regional integration in West Africa benefited from a long historical tradition of trade routes linking its countries. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 22 March 2011.

²⁴ Central Africa, including all members of ECCAS, covers 5,387,500 sq km. This area is about the same as that of the EU, Norway and the Ukraine combined.

²⁵ See Crisis Group Report, *Chad*, op. cit. and Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°71, *Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence*, 23 March 2010.

²⁶ Crisis Group interview, Angolan diplomat, Brussels, 14 June 2011. In 2006, around 87 per cent of Angolan imports came from South Africa while only ten per cent came from the DRC, its most important trading partner in Central Africa. See "Compilation of International Merchandise Trade Statistics – Angola", presentation at a workshop organised by the UN Statistics Division, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 12-16 November 2007.

²⁷ Exports from northern and eastern Congo, including minerals (coltan, cassiterite, gold and wolframite), timber and agricultural products, reach the global market via the roads in the east, particularly those through Uganda and Kenya leading to the port of Mombasa. The road network in Katanga province, in the south, has facilitated copper exports to Southern Africa as well as the import of goods from that region. See "Commerce transfrontalier et intégration régionale de proximité entre le Burundi, la RDC, l'Ouganda et le Rwanda", Initiative for Central Africa (INICA), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), July 2005.

²⁸ Angola was a founding member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), created in 1992. The DRC joined in 1997. Rwanda and Burundi joined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 2004 and the East African Community (EAC) in 1997. The diagram in Appendix D shows how the many communities of Central Africa overlap.

²⁹ The founding members of ECCAS were Cameroon, CAR, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe. Rwanda left the organisation in 1997 and Angola joined in 1999. See Appendix A for a map of ECCAS member states.

would have less influence and the headquarters of which would be located in Libreville, his own capital. Mobutu was also keen on launching ECCAS so that Zaire could become a member of the Central African community. A native of the province of Equateur in western Zaire, he wanted to strengthen links between his country and other Central African states.³⁰

During the 1980s, ECCAS, like UDEAC and CEPGL, found it difficult to stimulate trade between its members. Facing serious economic crises, member states prioritised close relations with European countries, especially with their former metropolis. During the Cold War, Western countries were keen to conclude contracts with African governments in exchange for ideological alignment. In addition, raw materials constituted and still constitute the backbone of many African economies and the market for these products is outside the continent, not in neighbouring countries.³¹

During the 1990s, serious political problems affected ECCAS members and considerably undermined their willingness and capacity to pursue regional integration: Angola, the DRC, Republic of Congo, Burundi and Rwanda all fought civil wars, while Chad and CAR were shaken by political crises. The governing elites were too preoccupied with reestablishing their authority inside their borders to invest time, money and political capital in the development of ties with their neighbours. Even after the signature of peace agreements, the conflicts between the governments of neighbouring states left behind them a legacy of deep distrust between elites and peoples, hindering the development of strong political and economic ties. As a consequence, ECCAS was put to sleep between 1992 and 1998.

The war in the DRC also deprived Central Africa of a country that, by virtue of its economic, military and demographic power, would have been able to take the lead in promoting integration the same way that Nigeria and South Africa had done in the west and south of the continent. Years of conflict and poor governance paralysed the DRC's economy and weakened its political status in the region.³²

The 1990s witnessed the resurgence of efforts to promote economic integration throughout Africa. Inspired and strongly encouraged by their European partners, African countries adopted a new conceptual approach

to integration. They realised they needed to go further than simply lowering customs duties and instead seek harmonisation of a broad range of economic policies. In order to achieve this, they were encouraged to submit to common rules and impose sanctions if these rules were broken. That meant abandoning some aspects of state sovereignty.³³

In March 1994, the six members of UDEAC tried to speed up progress towards economic integration by replacing the customs union with the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).³⁴ France supported this initiative and the adoption of a single currency, the CFA franc, cornerstone of the community. CEMAC attracted much criticism for not being much of an improvement on its predecessor,³⁵ but thanks to a shared language,³⁶ a relatively small size (compared to ECCAS) and the considerable support of international donors, economic cohesion developed more quickly within CEMAC than anywhere else in the region. This was transposed to the political level, strengthening diplomatic relations and giving the community a useful role in the first attempt at security cooperation in the region.

C. THE START OF REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Central African countries combined their multilateral peacekeeping efforts for the first time in the mid-1990s and once again at the beginning of the 2000s, when they sent a multinational peacekeeping mission to the CAR. Recurring crises and the chronic weakness of the state in this country made it an ideal terrain for an attempt at cooperation on security matters. However, instead of expressing the concerted political will of the whole region, the two missions turned out to be more the result of the regional ambitions of Omar Bongo, the president of Gabon, and the diplomatic and material support of France.

Following his election as CAR's head of state in 1993, Ange-Félix Patassé quickly began to use the state apparatus to his own advantage, alienating those who did not belong to his ethnic group. In April 1996, general social grievances gave

³⁰ Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 21 March 2011.

³¹ Bruno Békolo-Ebé, *op. cit.*

³² Edouard Bustin, "La désagrégation de l'Etat zaïrois et ses incidences régionales", in Daniel C. Bach (dir.), *Régionalisation, mondialisation et fragmentation en Afrique subsaharienne* (Paris, 1998), pp. 115-128.

³³ Bruno Békolo-Ebé, *op. cit.*

³⁴ CEMAC became operational after ratification of its treaty by member states in 1999.

³⁵ "The assessment shows that the change from UDEAC to CEMAC did not result in a significant improvement of CEMAC's functioning. The status quo predominated in many fields", "Diagnostic institutionnel, fonctionnel et organisationnel de la CEMAC", Performances Management Consulting, February 2006, p. 8. Also see Roland Pourtier, "La rénovation de l'UDEAC : sens et non-sens de l'intégration en Afrique centrale", in *Régionalisation, mondialisation et fragmentation en Afrique subsaharienne*, *op. cit.*, p. 185-198.

³⁶ Equatorial Guinea is the only member of CEMAC that was not a French colony; it is a Spanish-speaking country.

way to violence when the army demanded payment of three months unpaid wages and confronted the presidential guard. Two other mutinies in May and November caused dozens of deaths and led to the creation of a government of national unity. In November, the French army was deployed to prevent an escalation of the situation and lost two soldiers. Reprisals against the mutineers led to strong media criticism of France, which prompted it to seek less costly ways of keeping the peace in its former colony.³⁷

In December 1996, France convened a French-African summit meeting in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, where six countries (Gabon, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal and Togo) agreed to make troops available to the Inter-African Mission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB) created at that meeting. Benefiting from France's financial and logistical support, and later from a UN mandate, a 750-strong force was quickly deployed after the summit in order to ensure respect for the peace agreement between the government and the rebels and to supervise the disarmament process.

Following the death of some of their soldiers, MISAB troops took reprisals that far surpassed those of the French troops in terms of the level of violence. In June 1997, they bombarded the southern suburbs of Bangui with heavy weapons.³⁸ The death of innocent victims and material damage deprived MISAB of its image of neutrality in the eyes of the civilian population. Its troops were withdrawn in April 1998, with the French government no longer willing to fund such an unpredictable instrument.³⁹ This first multilateral mission was a test that clearly showed the need for rethinking, but it also acted as a precedent for the African countries participating in the peacekeeping operations and for the deployment of such missions in Central Africa.

In 1999, Patassé won the presidential elections but an attempted coup in May 2001 led to new clashes along ethnic lines with the security forces in Bangui. The president blamed the army chief of staff, General François

Bozizé, who fled to Chad to form his own rebel group with the support of his host country. Fearing for his safety, Patassé appealed to the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD),⁴⁰ an initiative of the former Libyan president, Muammar Qadhafi, who deployed about 300 Libyan, Sudanese and Djiboutian soldiers in December 2001 to make Bangui secure.

In October 2002, the six CEMAC heads of state decided to send a regional peacekeeping force to Bangui to replace the CEN-SAD force. At that time, peace and security were not part of CEMAC's strictly economic mandate, but ECCAS, then under construction as the regional peace and security structure, was neither politically nor institutionally ready to assume this role. Omar Bongo took the lead on this initiative. He was willing to invest political and financial resources for a mission in the CAR in order to strengthen his status as regional leader and reaffirm his influence in the CAR at the expense of Qadhafi. For the besieged Patassé, this CEMAC force, mandated to protect state institutions, was a recognition of his legitimacy.

Three weeks later, soldiers loyal to Bozizé attempted another coup in Bangui. They were repelled by foreign combatants defending Patassé, but the deterioration in the security situation quite rightly led to the sending of a peacekeeping force.⁴¹ In December 2002, the Multinational Force in CAR (Force multinationale en Centrafrique, FOMUC) was deployed in Bangui and remained there until July 2008. At its strongest, the military mission had 380 soldiers from Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Chad and Cameroon. Asserting his political leadership, Omar Bongo ensured that the two commanders at the head of the force during the six years of the mission were Gabonese. France again provided substantial financial and logistical support but the EU took responsibility for most of this financial burden as from 2004. Germany also funded the purchase of equipment.

FOMUC's mandate was to protect Patassé and to keep Bangui secured.⁴² However, the fact that it made no attempt to prevent the second successful coup led by Bozizé on 15 March 2003 clearly showed that a mandate approved by a regional institution carried less weight than the political will of the presidents of the region. Relations between Patassé and Idriss Déby, the president of Chad, seriously deteriorated after they accused one another of supporting each other's opponents. Idriss Déby, Joseph Kabila, president of the DRC, Denis Sassou Nguesso, president of the Republic of Congo and

³⁷ See Crisis Group Africa Report N°136, *Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State*, 13 December 2007, pp. 9-11.

³⁸ Jean-Paul Ngoupandé, *Chronique de la crise centrafricaine 1996-1997: le syndrome Barracuda* (Paris, 1997), pp. 251-253.

³⁹ Recognising the persistent risk of violence in Bangui, France lobbied the UN Security Council to send a replacement mission. The 1,350 strong UN Mission in the CAR (MINURCA) took over the job of ensuring the successful conduct of legislative and presidential election elections, which took place in 1998 and 1999. The mission withdrew in April 2000, judging that the security situation had sufficiently improved for CAR forces to manage alone. Angela Meyer, "Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa: From FOMUC to MICOPAX", *African Security*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2009), p. 160.

⁴⁰ CEN-SAD was created in 1998.

⁴¹ In addition to CEN-SAD troops, Qadhafi sent Libyan troops to protect Patassé on a bilateral basis. At the latter's request, Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la libération du Congo, MLC), a rebel group in the DRC opposed to Laurent-Désiré Kabila, also sent men to the CAR to fight on his behalf.

⁴² "Les chefs d'Etat approuvent le statut de la force multinationale en RCA", Agence France-Presse, 15 February 2003.

Omar Bongo, the region's senior figure, all gave Bozizé their blessing and told FOMUC not to intervene.⁴³ On 3 June 2003, CEMAC heads of state collectively recognised Bozizé's new government.

In response to this new situation, CEMAC ordered FOMUC to supervise the process of transition and reconciliation and to help prepare elections in May 2005. When rebellions broke out in the north in 2005-2006, troops were deployed to the provincial towns of Bozoum and in the north west to guard the Chadian border and Bria in the east.⁴⁴ The force's main mandate remained the defence of state institutions and its field of action remained limited to military issues. The long-term results of the mission in the country are consequently limited.

The innocuous presence of FOMUC in the CAR prepared the ground for more profound cooperation on security by demonstrating to donors that a multinational African force could be deployed at a considerably lower cost than that of an international mission, and without threatening civilians as had been the case with MISAB. The mission's non-interference in the overthrow of Patassé also reassured Central African leaders that deployment of a regional force would not prevent them from achieving their political objectives in other countries. On the contrary, the presence of the force conferred greater regional legitimacy on this undemocratic transition. It was therefore with cautious enthusiasm that Central Africa and the northern hemisphere viewed the pursuit of stronger regional cooperation on security.

D. TOWARDS A REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

At the end of the 1990s, the convergence of favourable political dynamics at the national, regional and international levels allowed ECCAS's revival and its affirmation as custodian of the peace and security architecture in Central Africa. At the international level, the death of soldiers during peacekeeping missions at the beginning of the 1990s had made western powers reluctant to risk the life of their soldiers again. They therefore encouraged continental and regional institutions to take responsibility for peacekeeping. With the reduction in inter-connected conflicts, the regional dimensions of insecurity became clear and the disastrous effects of war highlighted the importance of peace for economic development. The international political terrain was therefore fertile, but it was mainly the national and personal interests of the region's influential leaders that revived ECCAS.

In 1986, Paul Biya, then serving president of ECCAS, had asked the UN to help the organisation restore trust between states in order to reduce the risk of conflict. Two conferences and eight years later,⁴⁵ the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, created the UN Permanent Consultative Committee on the Security Situation in Central Africa (CCPN-UQSAC). In this forum, the region's foreign affairs, interior and defence ministers met to deal with peace and security issues and draft recommendations for ratification by heads of state.

The committee showed itself to be useful by gradually improving communication between Central African governments on security matters while ECCAS lay in a prolonged coma. At the end of the fifth meeting in Yaoundé, on 9 September 1994, the CAR, the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe had adopted a non-aggression pact. An identical pact was signed by all ECCAS members on 8 July 1996. The pact had little immediate effect. The first Congo war broke out in November 1996 and continued almost without interruption for seven years. Nevertheless, this initiative set a precedent.

Meanwhile, the death of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 and ten Belgian blue helmets in Rwanda in April 1994 sapped the Western powers' appetite for peacekeeping interventions in Africa. France, the UK and the U.S. all launched programs to build the capacities of African forces⁴⁶ and encouraged regional and continental institutions to establish conflict resolution structures. This change of political direction helped to bring to a successful conclusion the replacement of the Organisation of African Unity by the African Union (AU) in 2002. Contrary to the founders of the former, the main founders of the AU stressed the importance of collective security. The AU integrated regional organisations into the continental system by encouraging them to create their own collective security structures and mechanisms.⁴⁷ Although the AU was still not established

⁴³ A breakdown in communications led the Republic of Congo contingent responsible for guarding Bangui airport to confront Bozizé's forces. Crisis Group Report, *Central African Republic*, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

⁴⁴ Angela Meyer, op. cit., pp. 158-174.

⁴⁵ In February 1988, the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) organised a conference in Lomé, Togo, to promote trust, security and development within the ECCAS framework. A seminar followed in June 1991, in Yaoundé, on conflict resolution, crisis prevention and management and confidence building between ECCAS members. Mutoy Mubiala, "Coopérer pour la paix en Afrique centrale", UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2003.

⁴⁶ In 1994, France began to implement its own program to strengthen African peacekeeping capacities (RECAP). In 1996, the UK launched a Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, integrated into the Instrument for Conflict Prevention in 2001. In 1997, the U.S. began their African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), replaced by the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme (ACOTA) in 2003. Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁷ The AU's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), launched at the same time as ACOTA, included mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (Continental Early

by the end of the 1990s, the EU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa had become influential advocates of ECCAS's revival.⁴⁸

On 6 February 1998, in Libreville, the ten ECCAS heads of state held their second extraordinary summit, which ended with the decision to reactivate the regional organisation and broaden its remit to include the promotion of peace and security. This new orientation was to become the organisation's *raison d'être* as its economic functions became increasingly marginal (with CEMAC covering the same field, albeit with a smaller group of states). The aim was to create an institutional structure that could provide prompt and effective political and military responses to new crises and help to prevent conflicts, thereby protecting the region's economic development. Given its size, ECCAS's decisions and interventions would be seen as having the impartiality and legitimacy that was essential in the eyes of parties to conflicts and international observers.

Despite this revival, ECCAS faced the distrust of many Central African leaders who hesitated to commit themselves to a potentially restrictive integration project, and an unfavourable political context in several countries. The Republic of Congo, the DRC, Chad, Burundi, Rwanda and Angola were only just emerging from civil wars and were moving towards an uncertain internal consolidation. In Cameroon, the reserved character of Paul Biya was a brake on a more high profile involvement with the new project. Meanwhile, Equatorial Guinea had neither the resources nor the ambition. Only Gabon seemed to be active on the regional scene. President Omar Bongo's political talents and external support compensated for his country's rather limited economic and military resources and gave him a central role.⁴⁹

Warning System, Panel of the Wise, African Standby Forces etc.). The AU envisaged that the regional economic communities would take the lead on security by reproducing the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the regional level. As ECCAS had more members than CEMAC, it was judged to be better able to play this role in Central Africa. See the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union, 9 July 2002.⁴⁸ One of the EU's conditions for the signature of economic partnership agreements with ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries in 1995 at Lomé, and Cotonou in 2000, was that they commit themselves to regional integration. Bruno Békolo-Ebé, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁴⁹ For more on the regional political situation when ECCAS was launched, see Hakim Ben Hammouda, *L'intégration régionale en Afrique centrale. Bilan et perspectives* (Paris, 2003) and Angela Meyer, "Regional integration and security in Central Africa – Assessment and perspectives 10 years

Omar Bongo and Denis Sassou Nguesso were especially keen on ECCAS's revival. The former sought to raise his regional and international profile by means appropriate to his status as the elder statesmen of Central Africa. Sassou Nguesso, at his side, had just emerged in 1997 victorious from a bloody civil war that had left Brazzaville in ruins.⁵⁰ He therefore took a prominent role in the revival of ECCAS in order to legitimise his regime and restore his tarnished image. Laurent-Désiré Kabila's reservations about ECCAS worked to his advantage. Kabila had just won the first Congo war and his most urgent task was to consolidate his power.⁵¹ In the absence of other pretenders, Sassou Nguesso ensured that the secretary general position went to one of his countrymen, Louis-Sylvain Goma.⁵²

In January 1999, Angola, which until then only had observer status, requested permanent membership of ECCAS, which was accepted. Although its foreign trade was mainly with Southern Africa, the DRC's historical involvement in Angola's internal conflicts was a legitimate reason for President José Eduardo Dos Santos to seek greater influence in Central Africa. In recognition of Angola's oil wealth and military superiority, it was awarded the post of deputy secretary general responsible for peace and security issues.⁵³

On 25 February, in Yaoundé, ECCAS heads of state approved the creation of the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX). Based on the CCPNUQSAC model, COPAX is a forum for dialogue on peace and security and also a decision-making body.⁵⁴ The Conference of Heads of State is the ultimate decision-making authority and ratifies the

after the revival", Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, Paper 25, December 2008.

⁵⁰ "Trois guerres civiles en dix ans", *Libération*, 19 June 2002. Sassou Nguesso also reportedly funded the first ECCAS office in Libreville. Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Bangui, CAR, 24 January 2004.

⁵¹ Crisis Group interview, CAR diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 24 March 2011. Vincent de Paul Lunda Bululu, a DRC politician, held the post of ECCAS secretary general from 1984 to 1990.

⁵² Louis Sylvain-Goma is from Pointe-Noire, in the Republic of Congo. He undertook military training in France and rose to the rank of head of the armed forces in 1974. He was prime minister from 18 December 1975 to 7 August 1984, under three presidents, the last being Sassou Nguesso. He went on to occupy a series of political positions before working for the Agip Congo oil company from 1992 to 1998.

⁵³ See Section III.B for the internal structure of ECCAS.

⁵⁴ During a summit meeting on 26 June 1999 in Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, the heads of state integrated COPAX into ECCAS. The council's structure was also inspired by mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and peacekeeping and security established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Mutoy Mubiala, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

political proposals submitted by the Council of Ministers.⁵⁵ This body includes the foreign affairs, interior and defence ministers and meets once a year to validate the proposals made by the Defence and Security Commission (DSC). The DSC, which includes military and police chiefs and national experts, plans and supervises ECCAS's armed interventions.⁵⁶

At a summit meeting on 24 February 2000 in Malabo, capital of Equatorial Guinea, the heads of state signed a protocol establishing the founding principles and organs of COPAX and a mutual assistance pact.⁵⁷ According to this pact, all countries view an act of aggression against one of them as a threat to all and commit themselves to mutual defence against such threats. Heads of state appear to think it is legitimate to request political if not military support from a regional organisation to help them stay in power.⁵⁸ It is this mutual instinct for self-preservation between presidents, more than concern for the security of the region's people that has led to the revival of ECCAS.

III. ECCAS: THE SUM OF ITS PARTS

Since ECCAS's revival, the organisation's structure, activities and character have been determined by the wishes and habits of member states and, in particular, by their presidents. They have retained the power to make decisions on peace and security and their priorities have imposed on ECCAS a military and state-centred approach. The organisation remains a centralised and unfinished inter-governmental tool that suffers from deficient internal governance and is hindered by political obstacles.

A. A CENTRALISED INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TOOL

Just like the AU and other regional economic organisations in Africa, ECCAS is an inter-governmental and not a supranational organisation. Member states have not given it the power to make decisions on their behalf – they take the decisions themselves within the organisation. Moreover, ECCAS inherited a structural characteristic of its member states, namely the concentration of power in the hands of the presidents. In fact, the supreme decision-making body on economic, political and security issues is the Conference of Heads of State, which must approve all decisions made by the Council of Ministers.⁵⁹

Consequently, the decision-making process remains very slow because of the irregularity of the heads of state meetings. According to article 10 of the ECCAS Treaty, the Conference of Heads of State should take place every year. However, only three ordinary sessions and one extraordinary session have been held since 2006. The last session was the 14th ordinary Conference of Heads of State in Kinshasa in October 2009. Since then, no formal meeting has been organised, even though many peace and security issues are pending and need a decision. The summits programmed for March and June 2011 were postponed at the last minute for no valid reason.

In order to speed up the political discussion of security problems and improve communication both between governments and between them and ECCAS, heads of state decided in October 2009 to create a Committee of Ambassadors. During the meetings of this committee in Libreville, representatives of all member states are supposed to present their country's opinions on regional issues. The committee has only met twice and only to define its terms of reference.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ The presidents of member states are supposed to take it in turns annually to be president of the Conference of Heads of State, following alphabetical order of the name of their country in French. See the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States, ECCAS, 1983, article 10, paragraph 2. However, this principle has not been respected. Sassou Nguesso was president from 2003 to 2007.

⁵⁶ Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX), ECCAS, 24 February 2000.

⁵⁷ Ibid. On 28 January 2004, CEMAC member states signed their own pact of non-aggression, solidarity and mutual assistance in Brazzaville.

⁵⁸ This is precisely why Idriss Déby, president of Chad, convened an extraordinary summit meeting of ECCAS heads of state in March 2008 when rebels reached the capital N'Djamena. See Angela Meyer, "Regional integration and security in Central Africa", *op. cit.*

⁵⁹ Article 8 of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX), ECCAS, 24 February 2000.

⁶⁰ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS member state ambassador, Libreville, Gabon, 24 March 2011.

B. UNBALANCED INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION

ECCAS's peace and security institutions and powers have grown since its revival at the end of the 1990s. However, some departments included in the organigram (as amended in 2009) have yet to be put in place,⁶¹ while others lack qualified personnel.

At the institution's headquarters in Libreville, administration is strongly centralised around the secretary general, Louis-Sylvain Goma. All technical, political and administrative decisions are submitted to him for his approval. The increase in the organisation's activities made this centralisation problematic. It has resulted in departmentalisation, administrative sluggishness and a certain degree of inhibition in officials.

Article 21 of the ECCAS Treaty provides that the secretary general's mandate is four years and renewable once. By consensus and with the support of the Congolese government, Louis Sylvain-Goma has had three consecutive mandates. His succession is now open but member states are divided about how to replace him. Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon want the post to be filled on a rotating basis but Congo-Brazzaville wants to see another of its nationals appointed.⁶² Chad also wants to present a candidate.⁶³

Under the management of the secretary general, the ECCAS Secretariat has about 100 employees in four departments, only one of which works on peace and security issues.⁶⁴ The Department for Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability (DIHPSS) is the multinational organ that prepares cases, advises COPAX and implements its decisions.⁶⁵ Angola was given the right to appoint

one of its nationals to the post of deputy secretary general at the DIHPSS in 1999, but no replacement has been appointed following his departure in October 2010.⁶⁶ In the absence of someone in post, the secretary general created an ad hoc committee to manage the department but dissolved it in March 2011 because of internal disputes about who was in charge.⁶⁷

The deputy secretary general of the DIHPSS has responsibilities to the COPAX Secretariat and supervises the management of three sections: the Regional Staff Headquarters (EMR); the Department of Political Affairs, which is coupled with the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC); and the Human Security Department.⁶⁸ ECCAS's emphasis on military matters, the appointment of the head of the EMR by the Conference of Heads of State and the persuasive nature of General Garcia, in post since 2006, means that the EMR plays a more influential role in the DIHPSS than the other two sections.⁶⁹

The EMR has 22 employees in Libreville, including eighteen military personnel, two police officers and two civilians.⁷⁰ Its main role is to supervise the creation, training and operations of FOMAC. As it is one of the African Standby Forces, FOMAC is designed to allow Central Africa to deploy its own peacekeeping and consolidation missions inside and outside the region, rather than having recourse to foreign forces.⁷¹ It is difficult to evaluate FOMAC's capacities given

has not been replaced since. The management of DISC has been informally entrusted to Equatorial Guinea, but its nominee has not yet taken up the post. Crisis Group interview, ECCAS manager, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

⁶⁶ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS manager, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

⁶⁷ Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 24 March 2011.

⁶⁸ See Appendix F for a DIHPSS organigram.

⁶⁹ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011. General Guy Pierre Garcia, from the Republic of Congo, heads the EMR. He received military training in France, USSR, China and Algeria. In his own country, he was director of operations for the Congolese armed forces and military adviser to the presidency. He also led the team in charge of the study to create FOMAC.

⁷⁰ Crisis Group email correspondence, ECCAS official, 6 May 2011.

⁷¹ The creation of African Standby Forces is in progress in all regions, but some are more advanced than others. ECOWAS seems to have made the most progress in creating its own standby force, ECOBRIG. It has designated about 5,000 soldiers for the force, developed command and control mechanisms and created a planning body (PLANELM) and a rapid response unit. The fifteen countries of SADC are in the process of creating SADC BRIG. Officially launched in February 2007, this brigade has a planning unit in Botswana and less funding problems thanks to South Africa. The East African Standby Force (EASF) has personnel from fourteen countries and is being trained by the EASF Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM), based in Nairobi, Kenya. The UK, the EASF's biggest donor, is funding the construction of camps in

⁶¹ See Appendix E for the ECCAS organigram.

⁶² Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, N'Djamena, Chad, 6 March 2011.

⁶³ Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Libreville and N'Djamena, March 2011. The N'Djamena summit planned for March 2011, but eventually postponed, was to make a decision on this question. Meanwhile, the secretary general continued in office by default.

⁶⁴ Headquarters staff are mainly Gabonese, Cameroonian and Congolese (Congo-Brazzaville).

⁶⁵ The three other departments are the Department of Physical, Economic and Monetary Integration (DIPEM), the Department of Social and Cultural Integration (DISC) and the Department for Programme, Budget, Administration and Human Resources (DPBARH). A deputy secretary general is supposed to manage each department but three of the posts have been vacant since mid-2011. Only the DIPEM has one in office, a Cameroonian. The DPBARH deputy secretary general, a DRC national, left his post in October 2009 and

that the designated troops remain in their own country until they are called upon to conduct a training exercise or respond to a crisis. However, an inventory of forces approved by the Council of Ministers in February 2008 lists more than 5,000 men and women.⁷²

Basic training is conducted in each country but the EMR organises training for senior officers in Libreville to develop a common understanding of FOMAC's role and to standardise command and control structures and procedures.⁷³ The EMR has also organised training exercises in the field in member states. Most recently, FOMAC successfully conducted Kwanza 2010 in Angola in May and June 2010 to test the force's ability to deploy a peace-keeping mission.⁷⁴ Some 3,700 men and women dealt with a fictitious crisis. Following an evaluation, an AU team certified that FOMAC was ready to deploy in a level four crisis scenario in accordance with the AU's classification of conflict scenarios.⁷⁵ Military personnel led the exercise while police officers and civilians played a minor role.⁷⁶

FOMAC's training schedule runs to 2013, when another full-scale exercise is timetabled, this time with the aim of testing and ensuring the force's capacity for rapid

response.⁷⁷ With the EU's support, the EMR also plans to establish seven centres of excellence in the region, where national armies will be able to undergo specialised peace-keeping training and build up confidence in each other.⁷⁸

The military bias of ECCAS is shown by the fact that the Directorate for Preventive Diplomacy in the Department of Political Affairs does not yet exist and MARAC has only five staff. Created in 2007, the mechanism is supposed to inform and advise about potential or actual crises and forms part of the AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). By mid-2011, it was distributing daily and weekly press reviews but restricted distribution of its more analytical monthly reports for fear of being criticised by member states.⁷⁹ The planned recruitment of government and civil society correspondents in five of the ten member states should enhance its information gathering and analysis capacities, which are somewhat lacking at the moment.⁸⁰

The task of the Department of Human Security, created in 2010, is to tackle the potential causes of insecurity in the region and, according to the organigram, includes the following services: election and good governance, justice and human rights, the fight against crime and the free movement of people. However, it has only one staff member, whose work is focused on the control of small arms and light weapons.⁸¹

ECCAS's organigram is full of holes and has a serious deficit of human resources. Its revival has not been accompanied by the changes in recruitment procedures necessary to revitalise its operations.⁸² Internal governance has not been adapted to the appearance of new projects and the influx of European funds. On this point, ECCAS's image is no different to that of other African regional organisations, which are perceived to be administrative machines with neither the strategy nor the technical competence to accomplish their missions.⁸³

Kenya and Uganda that will allow the deployment of some 2,000 men within two weeks, ensuring the force has the capacity to respond. In North Africa, the lack of multilateral cooperation has hindered the creation of the North African Regional Capability (NARC). See Stephen Burgess, "The African Standby Force, Sub-regional Commands, and African Militaries", *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 2011), pp. 121-133.

⁷² This figure includes 4,300 ground soldiers, 1,000 police officers and 60 civilians from all member states. Crisis Group interview, EMR officer, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

⁷³ In the EMR, four countries play a leadership role in their respective field of expertise: the Republic of Congo (police), Cameroon (maritime security), Angola (deployment of troops and air forces) and Gabon (civilian component).

⁷⁴ FOMAC conducted several exercises prior to Kwanza 2010: Biyango, Gabon, 2003; Bahr el-Ghazal, Chad, 2005; Sawa, Cameroon, 2006; and a second exercise in Chad, 2007.

⁷⁵ AU scenarios range from Scenario 1, which involves the deployment of an AU regional adviser on a political mission, to Scenario 6, which involves AU intervention in response to war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. Scenario 5 is serious enough to justify the deployment of an AU regional peacekeeping force under Chapter VI of the organisation's charter. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC), African Union, May 2003.

⁷⁶ Crisis Group interview, EMR officer, Libreville, Gabon, 22 March 2011. Recognition of this military pre-eminence led the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations (Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, ROP) to organise a two-day seminar in March 2011 in Libreville on the role of the civilian component in peacekeeping operations.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ The following four training institutes have been accredited: the Brazzaville Engineering School; the Military Health School in Libreville; the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) in Awaé, Cameroon and the Higher Inter-Army Defence Curriculum (CSID) in Yaoundé.

⁷⁹ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 24 March 2011.

⁸⁰ The correspondents have been chosen in Burundi, Cameroon, DRC, CAR and Chad.

⁸¹ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

⁸² Many employees are senior civil servants from member states and are on secondment to ECCAS or nearing the end of their careers. Even so, many posts must remain vacant until recruitment procedures are decided. Crisis Group interview, ECCAS manager, Libreville, Gabon, 21 March 2011.

⁸³ On the operation of regional African organisations, see P.F. Gonidec, *Les organisations internationales africaines : étude comparative* (Paris, 1987).

C. INCONSISTENT FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBER STATES

A major problem handicaps the functioning of ECCAS: the irregularity of members' financial contributions. This compromises the budget and makes implementation of some projects impossible. Discussion of membership dues (Contribution communautaire d'intégration, CCI) only began in 1999 even though ECCAS had been created in 1983. All member states are supposed to set aside 0.4 per cent of the revenue collected from taxes levied on imports from outside ECCAS⁸⁴ and contribute according to a weighted scale adopted by consensus: Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea each pay 13 per cent of the community budget; the DRC and Chad each pay 10 per cent and the CAR, Burundi and São Tomé and Príncipe each pay 5 per cent.

The year 2005 was the first to see this system was applied. However, Angola challenged it in 2007, claiming that it was paying much more than some member states with more or less equal resources. Equatorial Guinea wanted to drop its dues to 10 per cent, arguing that the DRC should pay more because it has a larger economy than its own. Angola is also opposed to the system of integral availability of the CCI and has adopted the principle of limited availability (ie, it will not pay more than the budgeted national contribution even if the amount gathered from import revenue is higher).

Since 2007, only Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon have paid their dues on time. In 2010, they were the only countries that paid the entire amount owing. Angola, Cameroon, the CAR and Equatorial Guinea do not grumble about paying their dues but generally pay late. The DRC and Chad only paid their dues on time when they occupied the rotating presidency. Finally, São Tomé and Príncipe and Burundi are in arrears.⁸⁵

Theoretically, sanctions exist for non-payment but they are not invoked.⁸⁶ The irregularity of funding means that

the real annual budget of the organisation in 2011 was made up of the following contributions: CFA 14.4 billion (\$29.9 million) contributed by states, to which should be added CFA 4.2 billion arrears (\$8.7 million) and CFA 29 billion in contributions from foreign partners (\$56 million). The delays in structural payments mean that the budgetary calendar is rarely respected and the principle of budget appropriations is constantly violated.⁸⁷

D. MANY INITIATIVES BUT POOR RESULTS

Despite its internal problems, ECCAS administers the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) and is beginning to implement a strategy to improve security in the Gulf of Guinea. It has also launched five other thematic programs, all aiming to respond to collective security problems. However, the organisation's military bias means that more time, money and political will are invested in MICOPAX and joint operations in the Gulf of Guinea than on other important problems that require member states to evaluate their own governance (elections, border security and the proliferation of light arms and small weapons, etc.).

1. MICOPAX 1: A mission near its end

MICOPAX is ECCAS's most important achievement so far in the domain of peace and security, but the organisation cannot boast of having initiated it; it was inherited from previous multinational missions to the CAR (MISAB and FOMUC). ECCAS took over from CEMAC in July 2008, assuming the mandate for maintaining regional peace and security. After the death of Omar Bongo in June 2009, Ali Bongo, his son and successor, inherited responsibility for the mission. Consequently, it is still officially administered by a special representative of Gabon.

Unlike its predecessors, the mission theoretically comprises several dimensions. In fact, its staff is almost entirely military. The special representative has a small civilian team of less than ten members, while MICOPAX has 521 peacekeeping soldiers, 31 military observers and 125 police officers. Four companies (about 120 soldiers) are permanently on duty and each one is supplied by a different member state. The tour of duty is supposed to be six months, when the four companies should be relieved by companies supplied by four different countries. By mid-2001, Gabon, the DRC, the Republic of Congo and Chad had each deployed one company of soldiers and Cameroon had deployed one police unit. MICOPAX has a presence in Bangui and three provincial towns: Paoua

⁸⁴ Many regional African organisations are funded by a tax on imports from outside their area (State of Regional Integration in Africa II: the Rationalisation of Regional Economic Communities, UN, Economic Commission for Africa, AU, 2006).

⁸⁵ For example, Burundi's 2011 budget makes no provision for its contribution to ECCAS. Law of 31 December 2010 setting the general budget of Burundi for 2011.

⁸⁶ Article 80 of the Treaty Establishing ECCAS, "If a member state is in arrears for more than one year of payment of its contribution for reasons other than public unrest or natural disasters or any other exceptional circumstance that is seriously affecting its economy, the said state may, by virtue of a conference decision, be deprived of the right to take part in

community activities and cease to benefit from the benefits provided for in the present Treaty".

⁸⁷ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 25 March 2011.

in the north west, Kaga Bando in the centre north and Ndélé in the north east.⁸⁸

In 2010, MICOPAX's annual budget was hardly more than €30 million, with the EU contributing a little less than half through the Support for Peace in Africa Facility. France paid 30 per cent of this in the form of materials such as military uniforms and vehicles. ECCAS was supposed to pay only a little more than 20 per cent of the budget, to cover wages and the operational costs of the civilian component, but was incapable of managing this because of the non-payment of dues by member states. CAR contributed less than 1 per cent of the budget, to cover the rent, water and electricity costs incurred by the camp in Bangui.⁸⁹

MICOPAX's mandate extends until 2013⁹⁰ and aims to achieve the following objectives:

- ❑ consolidate a climate of peace and stability; assist governments with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of rebels, security sector reform (SSR) and maintaining public order; protect UN personnel and civilians;
- ❑ assist in the development of the political process; this includes support for government efforts in the fields of dialogue and reconciliation, and the organisation of elections;
- ❑ support the efforts of governments and NGOs to ensure respect for human rights; and
- ❑ coordinate humanitarian aid and participate in public health campaigns against diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS.⁹¹

⁸⁸ The military contingents should spend 45 days in one of the three provincial camps and two weeks at the Bangui camp to undergo training, but some stay in the field for longer. The Chad contingent spent four months in Paoua. Crisis Group interview, MICOPAX officer, Bangui, CAR, 25 January 2011. In February 2011, MICOPAX transferred control of its camp at Bozoum in the north west to the CAR army and, in response to rebel activity in the north east, moved to a new camp that it had built at Ndélé.

⁸⁹ Budget projections for MICOPAX in 2011 stood at more than €36 million. The EU will fund more than 53 per cent; France will supply materials worth more than 26 per cent of the budget; ECCAS will only finance just under 20 per cent and CAR will cover just under one per cent of the costs. Crisis Group interview, MICOPAX financial administration staff, Bangui, CAR, 26 January 2011.

⁹⁰ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 24 March 2011.

⁹¹ Decision N°02/ECCAS/CCEG/XIII/08 establishing the mandate of the Peace Mission from 12 July to 31 December 2008 and the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace from 1

In fact, MICOPAX's contribution has been limited. Thanks to its neutrality, it has been able to act as an intermediary between rebels who have signed peace agreements, the CAR army and local authorities and avoid small incidents degenerating into large-scale violence.⁹² Military observers were involved in all initial stages of the DDR process until it ran out of steam. MICOPAX was also supposed to train two companies of the CAR army every year, but they have been redeployed elsewhere.⁹³ During the January 2010 elections, MICOPAX provided logistical support without which balloting could not have been completed in some places.

However, most contingents were reluctant to risk their security, citing the preservation of their neutrality as justification for their inaction.⁹⁴ In addition, the force does not have enough personnel or vehicles to ensure the protection of civilians in the north, where rebels, criminals and armed shepherds threaten the security of villagers. There is a massive gap between the mandate and the actual capacities of the mission.⁹⁵

MICOPAX's disappointing outcomes partly result from the central role of the state in its mandate. This characteristic is designed to satisfy the host government rather than improve the security of the population. The non-dynamic nature of this mission was also due to the weak involvement of EC-CAS states, which grew tired of providing troops and are now talking about an early withdrawal.⁹⁶ Gabon is particularly keen on leaving. Although it was traditionally the leader of the force, it no longer has any interest or sees any need for maintaining troops in the CAR.⁹⁷

January 2009 to around 2013, Peace and Security Council for Central Africa in the CAR, ECCAS, 12 June 2008.

⁹² In November 2010, MICOPAX helped to resolve the conflict between Chadian shepherds and a local rebel group, the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie, APRD), operating in the north west. The shepherds accused the rebels of killing their cows. Crisis Group interview, humanitarian worker, Paoua, CAR, 28 January 2011.

⁹³ Crisis Group interview, MICOPAX officer, Bangui, CAR, 2 February 2011.

⁹⁴ The troops were reluctant to deploy to the new camp at Ndélé, where the rebels had not signed a peace agreement. MICOPAX officers said they did not need heavy artillery because they had not come to the CAR to get involved in the fighting. Crisis Group interview, MICOPAX officer, Bangui, CAR, 25 January 2011.

⁹⁵ At the end of June 2011, MICOPAX forces stationed at Kaga-Bando in the centre north of CAR were unable to stop clashes between Chadian rebels of the Popular Front for Recovery (Front populaire pour le redressement, FPR) and the APRD; eighteen APRD fighters were captured and more than 1,500 civilians displaced. Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team (HDPT), Information Bulletin 172, 21 June-5 July 2011.

⁹⁶ Crisis Group interviews, MICOPAX officer, Bangui, CAR, 2 February 2011; EMR staff member, Libreville, Gabon, March 2011.

⁹⁷ Crisis Group interview, adviser of the Gabonese minister for foreign affairs, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011. Relations be-

2. The Gulf of Guinea: A new subregional security initiative

Since the 1970s, the Niger Delta has been a troubled region. In 2006, insurgents began to establish more organised groups in order to launch what they called an “oil war”.⁹⁸ They used violence to demand a more equitable distribution of the oil income and financial gains for the area.⁹⁹ Nigeria’s return of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon in 2008 led Nigerian residents, who feared losing control of local trade and fishing, to use the same tactics to protest against the Cameroon government. Since then, piracy has spread eastwards into Cameroonian waters and even threatened banks in coastal towns.¹⁰⁰ In February 2009, armed men led a seaborne attack against the presidential palace in Malabo, in Equatorial Guinea.¹⁰¹ Arms and drug trafficking, illegal immigration and illegal fishing have also spread along the Gulf, increasing the insecurity of coastal states and threatening access to offshore oilfields.

tween Gabon and CAR cooled in January 2011 when CAR voted against Gabon’s proposal to continue nominating the director of the Bank of Central African States (Banque des Etats de l’Afrique centrale, BEAC). The CAR voted for a rotating presidency of member states, starting with Equatorial Guinea. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, president of Equatorial Guinea, currently the major contributor to the BEAC thanks to oil revenues, criticised the fact that Gabon had managed the bank since 1973. See “Querelles : Gabon et la Guinée équatoriale bloquent la CEMAC”, Cameroon-info.net, 19 March 2007.

⁹⁸ “Nigeria: Mend Declares Oil War”, African Press International, 18 September 2008.

⁹⁹ For more information on insecurity in the Niger delta, see Crisis Group Africa Reports N°115, *The Swamp of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest*, 3 August 2006; N°118, *Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis*, 28 September 2006; N°135, *Nigeria: ending unrest in the Niger Delta*, 5 December 2007; and Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°60, *Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta*, 30 April 2009.

¹⁰⁰ In September 2009, armed men landed at Limbé, Cameroon, and launched raids on several banks. For more on this attack and others in the region, see “Attaques – Les pirates prennent le golfe de Guinée en otage”, AllAfrica.com, 18 March 2010. The attacks continued across the Gulf of Guinea; at least 30 took place in 2011. The strengthening of security along the Nigerian coast may explain the big increase in attacks on the Benin coast in 2011. Nineteen have been recorded since January and have led to the introduction of joint maritime patrols with Nigeria. See “Nigeria: President Jonathan hosts Boni Yayi to discuss Piracy Issue”, *Africa Spotlight*, 17 October 2011; “Scourge of Piracy in Gulf of Guinea Threatens African Economies”, *News Blaze*, 20 October 2011.

¹⁰¹ For more information on the spread of violence in the Gulf of Guinea, see Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebodé (dir.), *Piraterie et terrorisme : de nouveaux défis sécuritaires en Afrique centrale* (Yaoundé, 2010).

On 6 May 2009, the four ECCAS states most affected (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe) signed a technical agreement establishing modalities for cooperation to ensure their collective security.¹⁰² On 11 August, they reached agreement on a joint surveillance plan (SECMAR 1) and patrols began one month later.¹⁰³ In October 2009, ECCAS heads of state created the Regional Coordination Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (Centre de coordination régionale pour la sécurité maritime en Afrique centrale, CRESMAC) at Pointe-Noire, in the Republic of Congo. Following a positive evaluation, the military commanders of the four countries reached agreement on a second surveillance plan (SECMAR 2) in February 2011. Attempts to involve the Gulf of Guinea Commission and ECOWAS are due to bear fruit in 2011.¹⁰⁴ This is crucial because Nigeria, which is a member of both the commission and ECOWAS, is not a member of ECCAS but is a frontline economic and military actor in the Gulf.¹⁰⁵

As part of making the Gulf of Guinea secure, ECCAS’s Secretariat would like to see the two regional groups, namely ECOWAS and itself, working together rather than leaving it to individual member states and Nigeria. Such cooperation would allow regional patrols to exercise the right of pursuit outside zone D (which demarcates the territorial waters of the four most affected ECCAS countries)¹⁰⁶ and in Nigerian territorial waters.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² In the same month, the Multinational Coordination Centre (Centre multinational de coordination, CMC) was inaugurated in Douala, Cameroon’s port city.

¹⁰³ SECMAR 1 was designed to make zone D secure, by targeting piracy, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and marine pollution. Crisis Group email correspondence, ECCAS staff, 16 May 2011.

¹⁰⁴ The Gulf of Guinea Commission includes Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, DRC, São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria.

¹⁰⁵ A good start was made in March 2011 when the U.S. funded Operation Obangame, a joint training exercise on maritime communications involving Cameroon, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria. Equatorial Guinea was not invited to take part because of human rights violations in that country. The exercise was originally planned to take place under the ECCAS banner but Nigeria was asked to join later. At the political level, some distrust exists between certain ECCAS members and their large and powerful neighbour, Nigeria. Crisis Group interview, American diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

¹⁰⁶ ECCAS has divided its maritime space into geographical zones from the southern border of Angola to Nigerian territorial waters. Zone D, which extends along the coasts of Gabon, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe, is the most affected by maritime insecurity. See the map in Appendix B. For more on ECCAS/ECOWAS cooperation, see Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebodé (dir.), op. cit.

¹⁰⁷ Endorsement by the heads of state was expected before discussions started but the issue was referred to the next meeting in view of the postponement of the N’Djamena summit in June 2011.

The rapid establishment of operations is due to the recognition by states of ECCAS's maritime interests, the urgent need to cooperate and the EMR's strong leadership.¹⁰⁸ The U.S. and other countries with economic interests in the Gulf support this cooperation.¹⁰⁹ However, funding remains a challenge because of ECCAS members' failure to budget for this initiative: CRESMAC is still at the project stage and they are not making available the expected military resources.¹¹⁰

3. The other programs: The arduous preparation of thematic policies

The secretariat in Libreville launched five thematic programs dealing with problems that fuel insecurity in the region. A lack of interest by member states and the secretariat's senior management means that all programs lack the funding, personnel and expertise they need to be implemented effectively and efficiently.

First, ECCAS has a program to ensure that electoral processes in the region are conducted in accordance with democratic standards and practices rather than causing unrest. It has sent brief observation missions to evaluate a dozen polls.¹¹¹ It also hopes to create a regional training school for electoral officers and establish a network of electoral commissions.¹¹² However, the permanent electoral unit only has one official, who is often absent. In addition, the more perceptive and critical reports on elections, such as the report on the 2011

elections in CAR, remain internal in order to avoid upsetting member states.¹¹³

A second program aims to improve governance in the security sector. The organisation held a seminar on security sector reform (SSR) in January 2009 in Kinshasa and prepared a work plan, which was adopted by heads of state in October 2009.¹¹⁴ This work plan sets out a range of measures that ECCAS could easily take, such as training and awareness-raising for parliamentarians and civil society about their role in SSR. However, implementation of the work plan has not yet begun.¹¹⁵ There is only one expert in the Department of Human Security who is working on SSR and that person is only working part-time. The way that ECCAS is supposed to contribute to national SSR programs in Burundi, CAR and DRC also remains vague.

Third, the border program, which is one component of the AU's continental project, deals with the problem of insecurity caused by poorly defined borders, cross-border crime and the presence of armed groups in these areas. Experts have conducted field research that indicates that the lack of cooperation between national border control services causes insecurity.¹¹⁶ Six border zones have been chosen as targets for intervention.¹¹⁷ The translation of this quality research into a collective action turns out to be more difficult than it might initially have appeared. A program document validated by the Council of Ministers in June 2009 recommended ECCAS define all borders that are still vague, build the capacity of border control authorities and encourage the development of a regional border management policy.¹¹⁸ However, the program remains at the design stage.

A fourth program aims to stop the circulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region. At the 31st ministerial meeting of CCPNUQSAC, member states signed the Kinshasa Convention, a legally binding instrument that sets out the controls that states must introduce on the production, trade and use of small arms.¹¹⁹ While

¹⁰⁸ Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 25 March 2011.

¹⁰⁹ In 2006, 16 per cent of U.S. oil imports came from the Gulf of Guinea and it is expected that this figure will reach 25 per cent in 2015. "U.S., China: Contending interests in the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria's Oil and Gas", Nigerian Oil and Gas Publication, 5 May 2011. The U.S. and Japan also have important fishing interests in the Gulf. Crisis Group interview, Japanese ambassador, Libreville, Gabon, 25 March 2011.

¹¹⁰ The construction site was chosen by the Congolese government but the working group must officially be in place by the next summit meeting of ECCAS heads of state. SECMAR 2 is supposed to combine air (two surveillance helicopters) and naval (three patrol boats) forces. But by mid-2011, although Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon had each made available a boat, personnel and fuel, patrols remained infrequent: no surveillance helicopters had been made available. Crisis Group email correspondence, ECCAS official, 16 May 2011.

¹¹¹ See, for example, the statement on the DRC elections in 2006. "Déclaration de la mission internationale d'observation de la CEEAC (élection présidentielle)", Kinshasa, DRC, 31 October 2006.

¹¹² "Le projet de création d'une école sous-régionale de formation en matière électorale examiné à Libreville", Agence de Presse Africaine, 13 May 2011.

¹¹³ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, March 2011.

¹¹⁴ "Un séminaire sous-régional de la CEEAC sur la réforme de la sécurité en Afrique centrale", Agence de Presse Africaine, 11 January 2009.

¹¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

¹¹⁶ See "Etat des lieux des frontières de la CEEAC. Synthèse des rapports", ECCAS, December 2008, pp. 19-20.

¹¹⁷ The six borders identified are: Chad-Sudan-CAR; Chad-Cameroon-CAR; Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria; Angola-Congo-DRC; CAR-Congo-DRC and the River Congo; DRC-Burundi-Rwanda. "Feuille de route 'Paix et Sécurité' de la CEEAC", ECCAS, 5 April 2010, p. 16.

¹¹⁸ "Projet de programme frontière de la CEEAC", ECCAS document presented at a workshop for experts, 21-23 May 2009.

¹¹⁹ The CCPNUQSAC mandated the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) to draft the conven-

the UN Secretary-General is guardian of the convention, ECCAS is responsible for its implementation. However, it does not have the necessary human resources.¹²⁰ Finally, the community is also trying, not without difficulty, to design a program to combat human trafficking.¹²¹

Since the beginnings of regional cooperation, Central African regimes have preferred to treat insecurity as a military problem rather than a governance problem. ECCAS has therefore inherited a military and reactive approach rather than a political and preventive one.

E. THE GEOPOLITICS OF DISTRUST AND THE ABSENCE OF REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

The establishment of a homogeneous and cooperative regional security zone in Central Africa is held back by a major constraint: the distrust inherited from the unresolved conflicts and inter-connected civil wars of the 1990s. Some governments remain very circumspect about the principle of regional integration while others treat some issues that come under ECCAS's remit as taboo. This distrust leads to a zero-sum vision of regional leadership.

It is very revealing that ECCAS does not actually deal with disputes between member states, even though the organisation was specifically created for that reason. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea have decided to settle the problem of Mbanie Island¹²² outside ECCAS's border

tion, which the committee's eleven member states ratified at the 31st ministerial meeting in Kinshasa, 26-30 April 2010. The full name of the convention is the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly.

¹²⁰ A single individual in the Human Security Section is in the process of developing a structure, including the national focal points through which ECCAS can coordinate the implementation of a regional action plan.

¹²¹ UNICEF and ECOWAS launched the initiative in 2006. UNICEF managed it until mid-2007. ECCAS recruited an expert to administer the Central African part of the program, but he resigned in January 2011. Crisis Group interview, MA-RAC official, Libreville, Gabon, 24 March 2011.

¹²² An island of just a few hectares, located at the intersection of Gabonese and Equatorial Guinea waters, Mbanie has no permanent population except for Gabonese military personnel. The area around the island is rich in oil. In 1990, Equatorial Guinea questioned the 1974 Treaty, which implicitly recognised Gabonese sovereignty over the island. The UN is currently engaged in mediation that is likely to end in a ruling by an international jurisdiction. In March 2011, the heads of state of the two countries met in New York, where they agreed to entrust resolution of the dispute to the UN Secretary-General. However, the Gabonese president, Ali Bongo,

program. Angola and the DRC have done the same with regard to demarcation of their maritime border.¹²³ Moreover, Angola does not want to regionalise the problem posed by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Front de libération de l'enclave du Cabinda, FLEC)¹²⁴ and resolution of the problem with the LRA seems to have been entrusted by common agreement to the AU.¹²⁵ This geopolitics of distrust also manifests itself in the domain of the free movement of people. Although this is an ECCAS principle, some states enforce tough border controls because they fear a destabilising wave of immigration from their neighbours.¹²⁶

has several times accused Equatorial Guinea of financially supporting his opponents. See "L'îlot de la discorde", *Jeune Afrique*, 3 March 2011.

¹²³ Since independence, Angola and the DRC have never been able to agree on the clear demarcation of their Atlantic maritime border. The dispute increased in intensity after oil was discovered along the Cabinda coast. Despite many discussions between Kinshasa and Luanda, the dispute remains latent. See "Conflit maritime Angola-RDC : Alfred Muzito s'explique devant le Sénat", *Le Potentiel*, 15 December 2010. In 2007, Angola unilaterally pushed back the Congolese border in the district of Kahemba in Bandundu and annexed an area of Congolese territory. See "Affaire Kahemba : l'Angola rejette la thèse de l'occupation", Radio Okapi, 13 March 2007.

¹²⁴ Cabinda is an Angolan secessionist enclave located between Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC. The FLEC, which has been demanding independence since the 1970s and is the Angolan government's final security concern, does not hesitate to take refuge in neighbouring countries, causing tension between the two Congos and Angola. Crisis Group interview, Angolan diplomat, Brussels, 14 June 2011. The Angolan army makes frequent incursions into the DRC, exercising its "right of pursuit" against the FLEC. Crisis Group interviews, parliamentarians, Kinshasa, 27 May 2011. Also see W. Martin James, *Historical dictionary of Angola* (Lanham MD, 2011).

¹²⁵ In June 2011, the ministers of defence of the countries where the LRA operates decided, under the aegis of the AU, to establish a Regional Intervention Force (Force d'intervention régionale, FIR). The summit meeting in Malabo, on 30 June 2011, ratified this decision to create a force designed as an AU mission with the support of the international community. See the final communiqué of the 17th summit of the African Union, Malabo, 23 June-1 July 2011.

¹²⁶ For several years, Angola has conducted a policy of violent border controls against Congolese nationals. Following these expulsions, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded cases of rape and death ("Angola accused of border terror", *Mail & Guardian*, 22 July 2011). In 2011, Gabon violently expelled 3,500 Cameroon nationals. Accused of being gold prospectors, they were chased away by Gabonese soldiers. This followed the sale of the rights to exploit the goldmine where they were working for a foreign company. See "Violente expulsion de 3 500 orpailleurs étrangers par des militaires gabonais", Radio France Internationale, 12 June 2011. Equatorial Guinea conducts a rigorous immigration policy that is essentially designed to discourage Cameroon, Congolese and Nigerian nationals from entering the country.

In the past, tensions between ECCAS states have affected the regional organisation. In June 2007, Rwanda withdrew, raising doubts about the future of the organisation.¹²⁷ Well before this, the then president of the DRC, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, also expressed a vague desire to leave ECCAS and join the Southern African Development Community (SADC) before retracting. These two cases raised doubts about the revival of ECCAS begun in 1998. Although no member state has so far formally questioned the existence of the organisation, none have shown any genuine and verifiable enthusiasm. Since ECCAS was relaunched, no member state has seemed willing or able to exercise regional leadership.

With Congo-Brazzaville assuming leadership of ECCAS by default since its relaunch and accumulating the positions of secretary general and head of EMR, and with the region now orphaned by the death of its president-patriarch Omar Bongo, the two countries – Angola and Cameroon – that enjoy political stability, economic success, geographical importance and military capacity have not shown any willingness to take Congo's place.

Angolan leaders can find few reasons to get involved in ECCAS. As far as economics is concerned, Angolan trade within the community is minor compared to trade with SADC.¹²⁸ Moreover, the language factor is a constraint: Angola is a Portuguese-speaking country in a Francophone environment and does not have enough senior French-speaking officials to occupy management posts.

Cameroon's potential to lead the organisation is held back by its very prudent diplomatic involvement in regional issues, which does not fit with the need for an active presence by senior officials in community decision-making bodies. Its main problem seems to be the self-effacement of President Biya in a region that has a very presidential power system. There is also the migration problem, latent diplomatic rivalries with Equatorial Guinea and Gabon and the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, which are currently the major security concern of Cameroon's political leaders.¹²⁹

Some countries have expressed willingness to take the reins but do not have the genuine capacity or legitimacy to do so. Chad has used its military resources and oil revenues to become a centre of stability between the Sahel and Central Africa and intervene militarily, if need be, in neighbouring countries.¹³⁰ Equatorial Guinea has ambitions to become the region's "tiger" during the next few years and attract investments within ECCAS.¹³¹ However, the problems of internal governance and external image that affect these two countries make difficult the realisation of their ambitions. Neither the CAR nor the DRC, two countries in a post-conflict situation and still politically fragile, nor the too small Burundi or São Tomé and Príncipe, are in a position to demand a role as motor of the organisation.

This lack of leadership and misunderstandings affect the functioning of ECCAS. So, for the last two years, the Conference of Heads of State has been repeatedly postponed.¹³²

¹²⁷ In his speech to colleagues at the community's Council of Ministers meeting on 5 June 2007, the Rwandan minister of foreign affairs said that "The Rwandan government has the very difficult task of telling you that it has taken the painful and difficult, though careful, decision to withdraw Rwanda from ECCAS. Dear colleagues, you will no doubt understand that Rwanda, as a founding member of ECCAS has a sentimental attachment to it and it was not easy for us to take the decision to withdraw. The relations of bilateral friendship and cooperation that unite us to each of the member countries in this economic group will not be affected." This withdrawal can be explained by Rwanda's geo-economic repositioning within the EAC, the fact that it had few economic interests in ECCAS, and also by its distrust of an organisation that it suspected of being under the influence of France and some members which were hostile to it at that time. Finally, overlapping membership in sub-regional organisations means multiple financial contributions. See Eric Rutsindintwarane, *Les facteurs d'intégration du Rwanda à la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est* (Toulouse, 2009).

¹²⁸ Trade between Angola and South Africa represent a fifth of their total trade with Africa. See "Compilation of International Merchandise Trade Statistics – Angola", UN workshop, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 12-16 November 2007.

¹²⁹ In CEMAC (and by extension, ECCAS), Cameroon criticises Gabon and Equatorial Guinea for using the principle of free movement of people and goods to avoid implementing agreements and to prevent migration from neighbouring countries. In recent years, Cameroonian grievances have become increasingly heated towards Equatorial Guinea, which it accuses of "arrogance" and unilateralism. Crisis Group interviews, Cameroonian diplomats, N'Djamena, Yaoundé, March 2011. Also see, Come Damien Georges Awoumou, "La Guinée équatoriale : le nouveau moteur de la dynamique d'intégration au sein de la CEMAC?" in *La Guinée équatoriale*, Enjeux no. 28 (Yaoundé, 2006) and Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebodé (dir.), op. cit.

¹³⁰ This point of view is defended by both Chadian political leaders and Western diplomats in the country. Crisis Group interviews, Chadian and American diplomats, N'Djamena, 6 March 2011. In fact, prior to its current military intervention in Central Africa in the form of MICOPAX, Chad sent more or less official troops to fight during the civil wars in Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC. In November 2010, Chadian troops launched a ground and air attack to dislodge rebels occupying the CAR town of Birao.

¹³¹ See Come Damien Georges Awoumou, op. cit.

¹³² The most recent postponement dates from 15 June 2011, when the official opening ceremony was due to be held in Chad. A communiqué issued by the Chadian presidency referred to "the busy schedule" of heads of state to explain the postponement.

IV. A CONFUSED WEB OF PARTNERSHIPS

ECCAS countries are also members of many other security partnerships – some symbolic, some real – but this proliferation generates perverse effects (competition, duplication, undue influence, etc.) and harms the image of the regional organisation, which lacks coordination capacity.

A. COMPETITION FROM BILATERAL FRIENDSHIPS

Security cooperation within ECCAS remains embryonic because member states prioritise bilateral alliances despite signing collective pacts and mechanisms. The community approach to security faces the problem that it post-dates the bilateral alliances established by states inside and outside ECCAS.

Many security partnerships compete with ECCAS. Since the end of the 1990s, Angola and the DRC have maintained significant military cooperation and Angolan troops played an active role in the consolidation of the power of Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his son,¹³³ before a reversal of alliances brought Kinshasa and Kigali together. In November 2008, in order to end the security and political crisis in the east, the DRC made a diplomatic U-turn and established a bilateral alliance with Rwanda, involving joint military operations.¹³⁴ Burundi focused its security policy within ICGLR and especially CEPGL much more than in ECCAS.¹³⁵

Since General Bozizé came to power in 2003, the CAR and Chadian governments have maintained security cooperation. The presence of Chadian soldiers in the north of CAR allows the two countries to counter any increase in strength of rebel groups in this border region and acts as a strike force in support of the CAR Army. Bangui has sometimes directly had recourse to military support from its neighbour, such as at Birao in Novem-

ber 2010, when the Chadian air force bombarded Central African rebels who had captured the town. Meanwhile N'Djamena sees the presence of its army in CAR more as an internal security operation against Chadian rebels who have taken refuge on the other side of the border rather than a regional mission.¹³⁶

Most member states have tried to ensure security through military cooperation or assistance agreements with France (Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, CAR), Morocco (Equatorial Guinea) or South Africa (CAR).¹³⁷ China and Israel also play a discreet but important role in military training and intelligence,¹³⁸ not forgetting the private security firms that help to train presidential guards, bodyguards and/or supply operational equipment, as in the case of Equatorial Guinea.¹³⁹ Involvement in ECCAS remains a secondary consideration for member states when developing their security policy, which sometimes resembles a quest for military assistance everywhere in the world without any concern for coherence.¹⁴⁰

B. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON REGIONAL SECURITY

Most ECCAS programs are funded by foreign partners from outside the region, namely, in decreasing order of the amount contributed: the EU, France and the U.S. This financial support is indispensable to the community's work on peace and security.

The EU funds ECCAS through two mechanisms. First, the African Peace Facility (APF),¹⁴¹ which is paid to the AU

¹³³ For more on Angola's role in the sub-region and especially on its contribution to consolidating the post-Mobutu regime, see "L'Angola dans la paix. Autoritarisme et reconversion", *Politique Africaine*, no. 110 (2008).

¹³⁴ See Crisis Group Report, *Congo*, op. cit.

¹³⁵ The CEPGL is preparing a mutual defence and security protocol and plans to organise meetings between ministers of defence, while the ICGLR organised a ministerial meeting in September in Kigali on "negative forces" (that is, armed groups). "La ICGLR soutient la lutte contre les forces négatives en RDC", *Digital Congo*, 12 September 2011, and "Réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères de la CEPGL", Burundian ministry for foreign affairs, 2 August 2011.

¹³⁶ Crisis Group interviews, Chadian army general staff officer, N'Djamena, October 2009. Also see Crisis Group Report, *République centrafricaine*, op. cit.

¹³⁷ For more on these agreements, see André Guichaoua, "Les nouvelles politiques africaines de la France et des Etats-Unis vis-à-vis de l'Afrique centrale", *Polis*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1997).

¹³⁸ In Cameroon, Israeli military advisers and experts have trained a rapid intervention brigade and the presidential guard, which are currently the country's main elite troops. China is training military personnel in almost every Central African country and its supply of arms to the DRC has been documented in a 2006 Amnesty International report ("China: Sustaining conflict and human rights abuses"). Also see, "Congo/

Chine : une coopération active", *Journal de Brazza*, 12 July 2011.

¹³⁹ See "Well oiled. Oil and human rights in Equatorial Guinea", Human Rights Watch report, 9 July 2009.

¹⁴⁰ The DRC illustrates perfectly the phenomenon of uncoordinated multiplication of military cooperation agreements. The U.S (Kisangani), Belgium (Kindu and Kananga), China (Kamina), Angola (Kitona), South Africa (Mura), France (Mbanza-Ngungu) train and have trained the Congolese military and each country has its own training base in the DRC.

¹⁴¹ The APF was created in 2003 to provide financial support for African peace and security architecture. Since then, it has funded

and then redistributed to regional organisations. Communications, not to say cooperation problems between ECCAS and the AU mean that these funds make little impact.¹⁴² The second source of funds, since February 2007, is the Peace and Security Programme (PAPS). As part of the Ninth European Development Fund (EDF), funding of PAPS 1 amounted to €4.8 million. As part of the Tenth EDF (2011-2013), ECCAS should receive an estimated €14.2 million (PAPS 2), an amount that is calculated more on the basis of EU politicking than on the beneficiary organisation's capacity to use the money.¹⁴³

France has significant influence on the forces composing FOMAC, through the Strengthening African Peacekeeping Capacities Program (Programme de Renforcement des capacités africaines en matière de maintien de la paix, RECAP), which provides financial and logistical support to African regional organisations for peacekeeping training exercises. It has gradually become part of the AU/EU strategic partnership. However, French military cooperation is particularly channelled to the region through the French Forces in Gabon (FFG) and its logistical mission in Douala, whose role is "to support the establishment of an air and land force for use in emergency interventions in Central and West Africa".¹⁴⁴

a range of field operations, including the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS I and II) – €200 million; the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – €16 million; and FOMUC – about €24 million. Most of the €300 million allocated to APF's 2011-2013 action program is for peacekeeping operations (€240 million). For a detailed analysis, see Dorelle Tchibayinga, "L'appui de l'UE au renforcement des capacités de sécurité collective africaines", Report of the Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, 2010; L. Higazi, A. Mackie, J. Nino-Perez, J. and A. Sheriff, "Regional approaches to conflict prevention in Africa. European support to African processes", European Center for Development Policy Management *InBrief* no. 4, 2004; and Sébastien Bergeon, "Le partenariat stratégique UE/UA face aux situations de fragilité", June 2009, at www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/Partenariat_UE-Afrique.pdf.

¹⁴² Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 21 March 2011.

¹⁴³ Only 70 per cent of the amount allocated under PAPS 1 was spent. Internal compatibility problems delayed the disbursement of funds. Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 21 March 2011.

¹⁴⁴ See "Projet de loi autorisant l'approbation d'un accord de défense entre le gouvernement de la République française et le gouvernement de la République centrafricaine impliquant un partenariat de défense", Rapport no. 245 (2010-2011), Mr Philippe Paul, on behalf of the French Senate's Foreign Affairs Commission, 19 January 2011.

The FFG cooperate with and train some of the region's armies. However, as part of the reconfiguration of its military presence in Central Africa and support for COPAX, France would like to use the FFG "to support the establishment of EMR units of the regional standby brigade, as well as support operational preparation of this brigade's units for involvement in peacekeeping operations."¹⁴⁵

The U.S. also wants to cooperate with ECCAS. Following the fourth meeting of the COPAX Council of Ministers in April 2010 and in response to the U.S. request for an agreement with ECCAS, the secretary general requested formal authorisation for such an agreement, while insisting on "exclusion of the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), in accordance with the spirit of the 13th Conference of ECCAS Heads of State and Government". The preparatory commission for the N'Djamena summit (scheduled for March 2011 but finally postponed) recommended the Council of Ministers to request authorisation from the heads of state to allow the U.S. to be involved in security operations in the Gulf of Guinea, where they have oil interests, and in strengthening EMR capacities.¹⁴⁶

The U.S. and France are moving towards sharing roles. The former will deal with maritime security, while the latter's assistance will take the form of logistical military support for air and land forces.

Given donors' interest in ECCAS, a Group of Friends of ECCAS¹⁴⁷ was recently formed on France's initiative. Still in its first stages, it has met twice and may invite China to attend in the course of the next few meetings. Its role is to make international funding of the organisation coherent.

The multiplication of ECCAS partnerships generates perverse effects.¹⁴⁸ It encourages member states to make little effort to perpetuate the organisation and to leave program funding and monitoring to external partners. These partnerships also take the form of the transfer of military systems (doctrine, organisation, operational compatibility of equipment, etc.)

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ The U.S. funded Operation Obangame in March 2011, a communications training exercise for military units. This was the first joint ECCAS/Nigeria operation. The U.S. also plans to fund a joint ECCAS/ECOWAS conference on maritime security. Crisis Group interview, American diplomat, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

¹⁴⁷ This group includes the EU, interested European states, the U.S., Japan and Brazil.

¹⁴⁸ Recently, ECCAS and the International Organisation of La Francophonie signed an agreement to intensify their high level consultations and cooperation to promote peace, democracy, sustainable development and trade negotiations in Central Africa. "Coopération renforcée avec la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique centrale", communiqué of the International Organisation of La Francophonie, 12 September 2011.

from the donor to the beneficiary and create scope for manipulation. By establishing MICOPAX, ECCAS leaders have done nothing more than to follow the suggestions of Paris, which had wanted to disengage militarily and was ready to provide financial support for a regional substitution force.¹⁴⁹ In the long-term, Central African countries and donors will have to consider how the role and objectives of external funding can create the conditions for coherence and promote a genuine partnership that benefits all.

C. A WEAK EXTERNAL PROFILE AND MINIMAL COORDINATION

As with ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD¹⁵⁰ and UMA,¹⁵¹ ECCAS is supposed to contribute to the continental peace and security architecture by creating one of the five brigades of the future AU Peacekeeping Force, which has been in the pipeline since 2002. ECCAS and the AU are supposed to work closely together on this project.¹⁵²

Despite the adoption of a draft agreement in 2008 between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), communication between the AU and ECCAS has been insufficient.¹⁵³ With only one liaison officer in Addis Ababa to cover all political and economic issues,¹⁵⁴ ECCAS believes it is marginalised at the

AU, where its mostly Francophone members do not appreciate the prevalent use of English.¹⁵⁵ In fact, the AU and the RECs are in general finding it difficult to define areas for cooperation.¹⁵⁶ ECCAS accuses the AU of passive interference and non-respect for the informal principle of subsidiarity¹⁵⁷ and thinks that the continental organisation is undermined by the rivalries between “the continent’s major powers”.¹⁵⁸

No member of ECCAS has an active and influential representative at the AU, which explains why they are worried that “powerful” countries might interfere in their internal affairs (and by extension their regional affairs) under the pretext of the AU’s supremacy over the RECs. This inability to have a decisive influence in continental diplomacy also explains the feeling of marginalisation felt by ECCAS.¹⁵⁹ The institutional web of regional structures requires the kind of coordination capacity that is so cruelly lacking at the community. The coordination between ECCAS and CEMAC is currently its best attempt. The two organisations work together and have the same objectives, namely regional integration. The only difference (except for the members) is that the mandate for peace and security throughout Central Africa is entrusted only to ECCAS.

In order to improve coordination and avoid duplication of efforts, the two organisations have created a rationalisation committee whose agenda has however yet to be estab-

¹⁴⁹ See Crisis Group Report, *Central African Republic*, op. cit.

¹⁵⁰ The Intergovernmental Authority on Development includes seven East African states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. It was created in 1996 to replace the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), created in 1986.

¹⁵¹ The Arab Maghreb Union, founded in 1989, comprises five North African states: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya.

¹⁵² The AU’s Constitutive Act stipulates that one of the organisation’s objectives is “to coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union”. Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act, 11 July 2001.

¹⁵³ Adopted in 2008, this Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa acknowledges the role of the RECs in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in their areas of jurisdiction and provides for the regular exchange of information and the development and implementation of joint activities and programs in the areas of peace and security, etc.

¹⁵⁴ Moreover, this liaison officer should be assisted by another but the post has never been filled for reasons that are not very clear. Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 September 2011.

¹⁵⁵ Crisis Group interviews, African diplomats, ECCAS officials, Libreville, Gabon, 22 March 2011.

¹⁵⁶ For more on the complex relations between the AU and the RECs, see Amandine Gnanguenon, “Le rôle des Communautés économiques régionales dans la mise en œuvre de l’architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité”, Foreign Affairs Delegation, ministry of defence, Paris, October 2010.

¹⁵⁷ By virtue of which the AU’s pre-eminence should give way to the more “regional” expertise of the RECs when handling cases in which continental intervention is unnecessary. See Dominique Bangoura (dir.), *L’Union africaine face aux enjeux de paix, de sécurité et de défense* (Paris, 2002) and Dominique Bangoura, Emilie Fidieck Abidias (dir.), *L’Union africaine et les acteurs sociaux dans la gestion des crises et des conflits armés* (Paris, 2008). However, the “handling” of the Ivorian electoral crisis showed the sometimes difficult relations between the AU and the RECs. Paradoxically, while pressing the AU to take quick action on the Ivorian crisis, some ECOWAS countries grumbled in the corridors about its “interventionism”, meaning by that, South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Angola, who they accused of interfering in a strictly West African affair. For more on the Ivorian crisis, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°171, *Côte d’Ivoire: Is war the only option?*, 3 March 2011.

¹⁵⁸ South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Libya (before Qadhafi’s fall).

¹⁵⁹ Angola is an exception, but, as analysed above, this country seems to prioritise its membership of SADC to the detriment of ECCAS.

lished.¹⁶⁰ Relations between ECCAS and other neighbouring regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, IC-GRL, CEPGL, SADC and CEN-SAD are purely formal. In the context of attempts to ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea, ECCAS must soon strengthen relations with ECOWAS.

The recent creation of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) in Libreville should promote better cooperation between the UN and ECCAS. In October 2002, Cameroon, which at that time was presiding over the Security Council, advocated the replacement of CCPNUQSAC by UNOCA. Following the example of the office for West Africa and Asia, the role of this office, inaugurated in March 2011, is to provide on-the-spot assistance to regional organisations.

V. TIME FOR DECISIONS

In order to avoid its contradictions turning ECCAS into an empty shell, as many fear and even desire, now is a good time to take immediate substantive decisions. If they really want to build Central Africa's peace and security architecture, member states must reinvest unambiguously in this organisation, raise its profile, reform it, rationalise security priorities and equip it with real coordination capacity.

Although internal discussions have already begun and measures have been proposed,¹⁶¹ the organisation still suffers from a lack of political will. Member states must evaluate their security interests and decide whether to really invest in ECCAS or leave it. Only such strategic choices will make possible the reforms that could revitalise the community and allow it to play the role it was expected to play in building continental peace and security architecture. This requires the convening of a Conference of Heads of State without further delay.

A. STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF STATES AND RAISING ECCAS'S PROFILE

Like other African regional communities, ECCAS suffers from muted political involvement by member states, which are focused on their internal problems and have multiple memberships of African organisations. In the field of peace and security, this political-institutional opportunism creates the conditions for competing initiatives, duplication and security alliances that are as specific as they are incoherent, to the detriment of genuine regional cooperation. To end this situation, member states should send a strong signal that they support the principle of regional security cooperation by trying to resolve their border disputes within ECCAS. Neutralisation of this subject or its referral to other bodies harms the organisation's credibility.

Finally, member states should open up the organisation to civil society. Greater participation by the latter should increase the legitimacy and raise the profile of the institution. The more the community's role is understood and assimilated within the region, the more it will benefit from genuine support in the countries concerned. It currently remains largely an affair of heads of state without the involvement of other national actors (parliamentarians, professional bodies, etc.). Community policies have not been put to a referendum or been the subject of public debates to define the priorities of each country. It is therefore imperative that member states

¹⁶⁰ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011. For more on rationalisation, see Ouedraogo Fatou, "La rationalisation des communautés économiques d'Afrique centrale : réalisme ou utopie?", Report by the Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, 2010.

¹⁶¹ Crisis Group interview, ECCAS official, Libreville, Gabon, 22 March 2011.

stop expounding long-term abstract objectives and take practical measures.

- ❑ States should undertake a cost-benefit analysis of their participation in ECCAS in order to find out whether it serves their interests, with all that implies in terms of rights and responsibilities. A decision to get involved should be translated into staff, funding and institutional reforms so that the organisation has the resources and mandate to achieve its objectives.
- ❑ ECCAS should prepare an annual work program setting out its security policy priorities. It should be made public at the beginning of the year to facilitate programming of external support and provide the public with precise information about what ECCAS is doing.
- ❑ Member states should take legislative measures to ensure payment of membership dues and include them in their annual budgets. Article 80 of the ECCAS Treaty, which provides for sanctions against late payers, should be applied.
- ❑ ECCAS management posts should be allocated to states that appoint their representatives to the Committee of Ambassadors and take up the deputy secretary posts. ECCAS should settle the issue of replacing the current secretary general as a priority at the next summit meeting of heads of state as well as the thorny question of appointment rules (rotating or reserved posts). Similarly, the Committee of Ambassadors should rapidly become operational and be given a clear and precise mandate.
- ❑ Each country should appoint, to its ministry of foreign affairs or other government department responsible for regional integration, a senior official whose role should consist of ensuring liaison with the ECCAS Secretariat.
- ❑ Finally, it is necessary to revise the founding texts of ECCAS in order to promote the participation of civil society and organise joint communications campaigns involving the Secretariat and national authorities to make plain the organisation's role and functions to the general public.

B. REFORM ECCAS

1. Simplifying the decision-making system

The pre-eminence of state sovereignty that characterises ECCAS's founding texts and makes it an inter-governmental institution means it is difficult for it to make decisions. The consensus rule that is supposed to guide ECCAS's decision-making hinders its development: designed to maintain the institution's cohesion,

it paradoxically helps to make it ineffective, by prohibiting any reference to issues that may be sources of disagreement between member states. To remedy this situation, the founding texts of ECCAS, notably the Constitutive Treaty and the COPAX Protocol, should be revised to simplify the decision-making procedure. The revision should:

- ❑ replace the consensus or unanimity rule for decision-making by majority vote on general administrative matters (adoption of the budget, creation or abolition of posts, appointments, etc.);
- ❑ strengthen procedures for a specific number of emergency matters (declaration of war, invasions etc.) and simplify consultation procedures in order to avoid "empty chair" politics bringing the institution to a standstill; and
- ❑ decentralise responsibility for issues that do not affect the essential interests of states to the Council of Ministers and the Defence and Security Commission.

It is possible to improve ECCAS's decision-making system by targeted decentralisation without transferring sovereignty.

2. Improving internal governance

The increasing importance of the peace and security agenda has highlighted the weakness of ECCAS's internal governance. In order to avoid reproducing the defects that undermine member states (lack of transparency and resources, unsuitable regulatory and financial procedures, lack of internal communication, etc.), members should reform its governance system, with emphasis on the following aspects.

- ❑ Reorganising the division of labour: Issuing an internal regulation that sets out the role of the secretary general and delegates powers to the latter and the deputy secretaries general. The principle of subsidiarity must be established as a basic rule of internal management.
- ❑ Strengthening human resources: Recruiting new staff through transparent procedures, taking into account the need for member states to be represented. Recruiting qualified personnel experienced in project management should increase DIHPSS capacity.
- ❑ Changing the financial rules: Adopt a new salary structure to attract qualified candidates; increase the resources and powers of the human resources department with the assistance of foreign partners; strengthen financial controls; conduct annual audits into the management of the organisation, using independent companies chosen according to transparent criteria, publish the results and apply sanctions.
- ❑ Restructuring the EMR: The mechanism should not be an over-militarised and autonomous structure within the Department of Political Affairs. Still embryonic, its civil-

ian component (police, customs, etc.) should be developed so that FOMAC can tackle the multi-dimensional nature of peacekeeping operations.¹⁶² Reaffirming the superiority of the DIHPSS is also necessary. The head of the EMR should be appointed by the Council of Ministers and not by the Conference of Heads of State.

C. RATIONALISING PRIORITIES AND ACQUIRING COORDINATION CAPACITY

ECCAS currently has to deal with numerous priorities that must be organised into a hierarchy in order to avoid institutional saturation. Rationalising priorities requires first evaluating the feasibility of the organisation's five programs (borders, elections, security sector reform, proliferation of light arms and human trafficking), some of which are still at the design stage. They must be assessed on the basis of how they are going to be put into practice and achieve practical results in the field. Those felt to be too ambitious should be abandoned to avoid needless dispersion of resources.

ECCAS must then really get to grips with the question of its operational capacity and its contribution to the African Standby Force. It should conduct an evaluation of its first field operation in CAR and a lessons-learned exercise on deployment and how to react for use in future engagements. An evaluation is indispensable in order to assess a mission that mobilised a significant amount of resources and which seems near its end. Moreover, because of the duration of the mission and the weariness of contributing countries, now is the time to prepare an exit strategy to consolidate the gains made and avoid leaving a brutal security vacuum.

Given the increasing risks in the Gulf of Guinea,¹⁶³ the implementation of the maritime security strategy should be speeded up. The construction of CRESMAC, the intensification of joint maritime patrols and the formalisation of ECCAS/ECOWAS cooperation with maritime security exercises should be on the list of short-term priorities.

In order to improve cooperation between ECCAS and the AU, the organisation's work program should include the revision of the COPAX Protocol to bring it

into line with the Constitutive Act of the AU. It should not be forgotten that the creation of the AU in 2002 was accompanied by a commitment to ensure security of individuals despite the sovereignty of member states. The Constitutive Act of the AU gave the organisation the right to intervene in the event of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity.¹⁶⁴ The COPAX Protocol lists seven guiding principles, including the protection of individual basic rights and freedoms but it has not aligned them with AU principles. Revision of the COPAX Protocol in order to bring it into line with the Constitutive Act of the AU is overdue and should be made a priority.¹⁶⁵

Finally, considering the proliferation of external partnerships and the need to cooperate with other multilateral organisations, ECCAS must equip itself with the capacity for intra-regional, inter-regional and international coordination. This should be strengthened through the creation of a coordination service within the DIHPSS, which should be given responsibility for promoting cooperation and exchanging ideas with the Group of Friends of ECCAS, the AU, UNOCA and other regional African organisations. The service would allow ECCAS to strengthen its representation at the AU, help make external partnerships complementary rather than competitive as they are now and increase the appropriation of assistance by ECCAS in accordance with the principles of the Paris Declaration.¹⁶⁶ In this regard, it is important for external aid to be aligned with the security priorities defined by ECCAS while being proportionate to its capacities to use the funding. To this end, external partners (present and future) should make efforts to coordinate their aid through the Group of Friends of ECCAS.

¹⁶² After the information and awareness raising seminar on the civilian component in Libreville organised by the Francophone Piece Operations Network (Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, ROP) in March 2011, an ECCAS delegation made a study visit to the UN Mission in the DRC to learn good practices in July of the same year.

¹⁶³ "Piracy on the rise off West Africa's coast", *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August 2011.

¹⁶⁴ Article 4.h of the Constitutive Act of the AU.

¹⁶⁵ Crisis Group interview, member of the EMR, Libreville, Gabon, 23 March 2011.

¹⁶⁶ The OECD has set out the following guiding principles for development aid: ownership, harmonisation alignment, managing for results and mutual accountability (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005).

VI. CONCLUSION

In order for political and security cooperation not to repeat the failures of economic integration, stakeholders should reflect on ECCAS's experience so far. This allows us to realise the inappropriateness of certain institutional steps, the counter-productive nature of "grand geopolitical designs", the complexity of regional politics and the ambivalence of external partners. The organisation's experience is not an isolated case and should of course be considered in the context of the continental peace and security system, which is the major African political project of the beginning of this century.

In the context of this grand design, ECCAS's experience reveals a doubly asymmetric regionalisation: on one hand, Central Africa is less politically integrated and less institutionally efficient than the other regions on the continent; on the other hand, the region's governments have no great desire for an assertive political and security cooperation that could raise questions about their opportunism and could prompt national desires for regional leadership. Without genuine commitment to the project for peace and security architecture, the word "cooperation" will remain an obligatory but tired word in diplomatic discourse, external support will have only an artificial impact and summit meetings of heads of state will continue to be postponed sine die.

Nairobi/Brussels, 7 November 2011

APPENDIX A


MAP OF ECCAS MEMBER STATES



Based on UN map No. 4045 Rev. 5, April 2009

APPENDIX B

MAP OF ECCAS TERRITORIAL WATERS




This map shows the three zones – A, B and D – into which ECCAS has divided its territorial waters.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ Source: “Rôle des organisations régionales dans le maintien de la paix – Expérience de la CEEAC”, ECCAS presentation.


APPENDIX C

POPULATION AND GDP OF ECCAS COUNTRIES

Population (millions of inhabitants)




GDP per capita (in millions of U.S. dollars)



Source population: <http://www.statistiques-mondiales.com>
Source population São Tomé-et-Príncipe: <http://donnees.banquemondiale.org/pays/sao-tome-et-principe>
Source PIB: <http://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> (years 2005-2010)

APPENDIX D


REGIONAL COMMUNITIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA



- ECCAS** **Economic Community of Central African States:** Cameroon, the CAR, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, DRC, Burundi, Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe.
- CEMAC** **Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa** (Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale): Cameroon, the CAR, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad.
- CEPGL** **Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries** (Communauté économique des pays des grands lacs): DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.
- ICGLR** **International Conference of the Great Lakes Region:** Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia.
- SADC** **Southern African Development Community:** Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- EAC** **East African Community:** Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.

APPENDIX E


ECCAS ORGANIGRAM



DIPEM	Department of Physical, Economic and Monetary Integration.
DIHPSS	Department of Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability.
DISC	Department of Social and Cultural Integration.
DPBARH	Department of Programmes, Budget, Administration and Human Resources.
MARAC	Central African Early Warning Mechanism.

APPENDIX F

DIHPSS ORGANIGRAM



DIHPSS Department of Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability.
COPAX Peace and Security Council for Central Africa.
MARAC Central African Early Warning Mechanism.

APPENDIX G

CHRONOLOGY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA

October 1958

Barthélemy Boganda launches abortive initiative – United States of Latin Africa Agreement. The father of Central African independence wanted to unite members of French Equatorial Africa, Portugal's Angola and the Belgian colonies of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) into a larger regional group.

June 1959

Creation of the Equatorial Customs Union (l'Union douanière équatoriale, UDE) grouping the Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad.

18 May 1960

The Republic of Congo, Chad and the CAR sign the Fort-Lamy Charter creating the Union of Central African Republics (Union des républiques d'Afrique centrale). Gabon refuses to sign the Charter, which created a simple customs union. The project was quickly abandoned.

1961

Cameroon joins the UDE.

8 December 1964

Gabon, Chad, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo and CAR heads of state sign the Brazzaville Treaty creating the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (Union douanière et économique d'Afrique centrale, UDEAC).

1 January 1966

The UDEAC treaty comes into force.

2 April 1968

At the instigation of Zaire, Chad, CAR and Zaire create the Union of Central African States (Union des Etats d'Afrique centrale). The CAR only remained a member for a few months and Chad joined UDEAC in 1971.

October 1983

In Libreville, Burundi, Rwanda, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the CAR, the DRC, Chad, Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe sign a treaty creating the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

January 1984

Equatorial Guinea joins UDEAC.

December 1984

The ECCAS Treaty comes into force.

28 May 1992

The UN creates the Permanent Consultative Committee on Peace and Security Questions in Central Africa (CCPNUQSAC).

16 March 1994

In N'Djamena, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the CAR and Chad sign the treaty creating the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale, CEMAC). CEMAC replaces UDEAC, judged to be ineffective.

8 July 1996

ECCAS states sign a non-aggression pact in Yaoundé.

25 January 1997

The heads of state of Gabon, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mali mediate in the Central African crisis. The Bangui Accords establish a truce between forces loyal to President Patassé and the rebels led by Commander Anicet Saulet.

31 January 1997

Creation of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords (Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui, MISAB), in accordance with the terms of the agreement concluded at the conference for cooperation and dialogue held in Bangui, 11-16 January 1997.

8 February 1997

MISAB deploys in Bangui. Composed of 750 soldiers from the four countries whose heads of state sit on the mediation committee (Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali and Chad) and contingents from Senegal and Togo in support. Gabon assumes military command of the operation and France provides logistical and financial support.

5 February 1998

Official dissolution of UDEAC; replaced by CEMAC.

6 February 1998

Libreville Summit "revives" ECCAS, until then ineffective. Heads of state agree to breathe new life into the organisation and to take responsibility for peace and security in the subregion.

25 February 1999

Decision in Yaoundé creating the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Afrique centrale, COPAX).

June 1999

ECCAS Summit in Malabo identifies priorities: development of peacekeeping capacity, economic and monetary integration and creation of an independent funding mechanism.

24 February 2000

Meeting at an extraordinary conference in Malabo; ECCAS heads of state sign a mutual assistance pact and a protocol regarding COPAX.

April 2000

Creation of a CEMAC Court of Justice in N'Djamena.

22 June 2000

Creation of a CEMAC Inter-Parliamentary Commission in Malabo.

July 2002

At Durban, in South Africa, the AU and RECs adopt a memorandum of understanding on security, stability, development and cooperation.

25 October 2002

CEMAC launches a Multinational Force in Central African Republic (Force multinationale en Centrafrique, FOMUC), which replaces the UN Mission in the CAR (MINURCA) whose mandate ended in 2000. The aim is to ensure a secure environment for the population and support the creation of the Central African Armed Forces. FOMUC has around 350 men from three African countries (Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad). Its deployment is supported by the French BOALI detachment, numbering 200.

2003

ECCAS introduces membership dues (Contribution communautaire d'intégration, CCI) to provide the re-

sources necessary to fund its projects. Only five of the eleven member states sign the agreement providing for implementation of the CCI.

July 2003

ECCAS mediates following the 16 July coup in São Tomé and Príncipe.

October 2003

ECCAS creates a regional peacekeeping brigade. FOMAC becomes part of the African Standby Force (ASF), forming one of the five brigades planned by the AU peace and security architecture.

28 January 2004

CEMAC members sign a non-aggression, solidarity and mutual assistance pact in Brazzaville.

2005

The 12th conference of ECCAS heads of state creates an Electoral Unit at the ECCAS Secretariat. Since then, ECCAS has deployed seven short-term electoral observation missions. Lack of resources has meant that the unit has not yet been able to lead a genuine mission to support national structures or any medium or long-term missions.

June 2006

The European Union grants €4 million from the Ninth European Development Fund (EDF) to strengthen ECCAS's capacity to take preventive action and, in particular, operationalise the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (Mécanisme d'alerte rapide de l'Afrique centrale, MARAC). The EU's African Peace Facility (APF), created in 2004 to support peacekeeping operations in Africa as well as the peace and security architecture, also made funds available for the recruitment and salaries of nine officers for a period of three years to be employed by FOMAC.

November 2006

ECCAS organises a subregional multinational manoeuvre (SAWA 2006) in Cameroon.

February 2007

Launch of the Peace and Security Support Programme (Programme d'appui en matière de paix et de sécurité, PAPS), funded by the Ninth EDF for ECCAS.

5 June 2007

Rwanda leaves ECCAS and joins the East African Community in July 2007, because the country "faces problems

related to overlapping memberships in regional economic communities" requiring additional costs.

10-17 November 2007

Upon Chad's invitation, armed forces of ECCAS member states and Togo conduct multinational inter-army peacekeeping exercise at Bahr el-Ghazal in Chad.

February 2008

All ECCAS member states sign laws designating units for the regional standby brigade and the Regional Staff Headquarters (EMR).

Mars 2008

Extraordinary CEMAC meeting in Kinshasa on the Chad situation. The summit urges member states to provide emergency assistance to Chad.

Mai 2008

ECCAS sends electoral observation mission to Equatorial Guinea.

12 July 2008

FOMUC is replaced by the Peace Consolidation Mission in the CAR (Mission de consolidation de la paix en CAR, MICOPAX 1) under ECCAS's authority.

September 2008

ECCAS sends electoral observation mission to Angola.

February 2009

Request to amend COPAX protocol "to adapt it to current developments and issues, notably the AU peace and security structure". The objective is to reconfigure police cooperation, make effective and certify the operational capacities of COPAX structures and strengthen the operational capacities of member state units liaising with to FOMAC. In sum, it aims to promote the synergies and interoperability of COPAX with the other RECs and the AU Peace and Security Council. This has yet to be implemented.

21-23 May 2009

Regional workshop in Libreville on the implementation of the AU and ECCAS Border Programme.

June 2009

Four member states (Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe) initiate a security strategy and monitoring operation to contain emerging risks in the Gulf of Guinea.

June 2009

Member states validate the ECCAS Border Programme. This programme also forms part of the AU Border Programme ratified by the AU Executive Council at its 11th ordinary session (June 2007) and operates in accordance with the mandate provided by the 13th Conference of Heads of State and Government to the Secretary General (October 2007).

July 2009

ECCAS sends electoral observation mission to the Republic of Congo.

August 2009

ECCAS sends electoral observation mission to Gabon.

24 October 2009

Organisation of the 14th summit of ECCAS heads of state and government in Kinshasa, with the aim of finding a solution to the crisis in the east of the country. The summit also validates the ECCAS Border Programme, creates a Committee of Ambassadors to act as a permanent interface between the ECCAS Secretariat and the high political authorities of member states, and a Strategic Analysis Group in the Secretariat which constitutes the first rung of the crisis management decision-making process.

22 May-10 June 2010

Kwanza 2010 exercise conducted in Angola; ends with the AU's validation of FOMAC.

January 2011

ECCAS sends electoral observation mission to the CAR.

Mars 2011

Postponement of the 15th Conference of Heads of State and Government.

June 2011

New postponement of the 15th Conference of Heads of State and Government.

APPENDIX H

ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command	FNL	National Liberation Forces/Forces nationales de libération
APF	African Peace Facility		
AU	African Union	FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
CAR	Central African Republic	FOMAC	Central African Multinational Force
CCI	Community Integration Contribution	FOMUC	Multinational Force in Central African Republic
CCPNUQSAC	United Nations Permanent Consultative Committee on the Security Situation in Central Africa	Franc CFA	Currency of the African Financial Community
CDS	Defence and Security Committee	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa	LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States	MARAC	Central African Early Warning Mechanism/Mécanisme d'alerte rapide de l'Afrique centrale
CEPGL	Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries		
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System	MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic
ICGLR	International Conference of the Great Lakes Region	MISAB	Inter-African Mission for the Monitoring of the Bangui Accords/Mission inter-africaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui
COPAX	Peace and Security Council for Central Africa		
CRESMAC	Regional Coordination Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa	MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Program	PAPS	Peace and Security Support Program/Programme d'appui en matière de paix et de sécurité
DIHPSS	Department of Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability (ECCAS)	RECs	Regional Economic Communities
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	ROP	Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations/Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix
EAC	East African Community		
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	SECMAR	Joint Surveillance/Monitoring Plan/Plan de surveillance commune
EDF	European Development Fund	SSR	Security Sector Reform
EMR	Regional Staff Headquarters/Etat-major régional	UDEAC	Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa/Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale
FFG	French Forces in Gabon	UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda/Front de libération de l'enclave du Cabinda	UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
		UNOCA	United Nations Office for Central Africa

APPENDIX I

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in fourteen additional locations (Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Bujumbura, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Seoul). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,

Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.

Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, institutional foundations, and private sources. The following governmental departments and agencies have provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for International Development, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development and Research Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Commission, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Agency, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Department for International Development, United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. Agency for International Development.

The following institutional and private foundations have provided funding in recent years: Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Charitable Foundation, Clifford Chance Foundation, Connect U.S. Fund, The Elders Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish World Watch, Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Institute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and VIVA Trust.

November 2011

APPENDIX J

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2008

Central Africa

Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, Africa Report N°140, 13 May 2008 (also available in French).

Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue, Africa Briefing N°53, 19 August 2008 (also available in French).

Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework, Africa Report N°144, 24 September 2008 (also available in French).

Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue, Africa Briefing N°55, 9 December 2008 (also available in French).

Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, with or without Kony, Africa Report N°146, 10 December 2008.

Chad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa Report N°149, 15 April 2009 (also available in French).

Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, Africa Report N°150, 11 May 2009 (also available in French).

Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, Africa Report N°151, 9 July 2009 (also available in French).

Burundi: réussir l'intégration des FNL, Africa Briefing N°63, 30 July 2009.

Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap, Africa Briefing N°65, 26 August 2009 (also available in French).

CAR: Keeping the Dialogue Alive, Africa Briefing N°69, 12 January 2010 (also available in French).

Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections, Africa Report N°155, 12 February 2010 (also available in French).

Libye/Tchad: au-delà d'une politique d'influence, Africa Briefing N°71, 23 March 2010 (also available in Arabic).

Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010 (also available in French).

Chad: Beyond Superficial Stability, Africa Report N°162, 17 August 2010 (only available in French).

Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda, Africa Report N°165, 16 November 2010 (also available in French).

Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic, Africa Report N°167, 16 December 2010 (also available in French).

Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse, Africa Report N°169, 7 February 2011 (also available in French).

Le Nord-ouest du Tchad: la prochaine zone à haut risque?, Africa Briefing N°78, 17 February 2011.

Congo: The Electoral Dilemma, Africa Report N°175, 5 May 2011 (also available in French).

Congo: The Electoral Process Seen from the East, Africa Briefing N°80, 5 September 2011 (also available in French).

Africa without Qaddafi: The Case of Chad, Africa Report N°180, 21 October 2011 (also available in French).

Mettre en œuvre l'architecture de paix et de sécurité (I): l'Afrique centrale, Africa Report N°181, 7 November 2011.

The Lord's Resistance Army: End Game?, Africa Report N°182, 17 November 2011.

Horn of Africa

Kenya in Crisis, Africa Report N°137, 21 February 2008.

Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis, Africa Briefing N°50, 13 March 2008 (also available in Arabic).

Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War, Africa Report N°141, 17 June 2008.

Sudan's Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?, Africa Report N°145, 21 October 2008 (also available in Arabic).

Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report N°147, 23 December 2008.

Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, Africa Report N°152, 17 July 2009.

Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland, Africa Briefing N°64, 12 August 2009.

Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009.

Somaliland: A Way out of the Electoral Crisis, Africa Briefing N°67, 7 December 2009.

Sudan: Preventing Implosion, Africa Briefing N°68, 17 December 2009.

Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan, Africa Report N°154, 23 December 2009.

Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, Africa Briefing N°72, 30 March 2010.

LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony, Africa Report N°157, 28 April 2010 (also available in French).

Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence, Africa Report N°159, 6 May 2010.

Somalia's Divided Islamists, Africa Briefing N°74, 18 May 2010 (also available in Somali).

Sudan: Defining the North-South Border, Africa Briefing N°75, 2 September 2010.

Eritrea: The Siege State, Africa Report N°163, 21 September 2010.

Negotiating Sudan's North-South Future, Africa Briefing N°76, 23 November 2010.

Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, Africa Report N°170, 21 February 2011.

Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan, Africa Briefing N°172, 4 April 2011.

Divisions in Sudan's Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country's Stability, Africa Report N°174, 4 May 2011.

South Sudan: Compounding Instability in Unity State, Africa Report N°179, 17 October 2011 (also available in Chinese).

Southern Africa

Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election, Africa Report N°138, 20 March 2008.

Negotiating Zimbabwe's Transition, Africa Briefing N°51, 21 May 2008.

Ending Zimbabwe's Nightmare: A Possible Way Forward, Africa Briefing N°56, 16 December 2008.

Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government, Africa Briefing N°59, 20 April 2009.

Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition, Africa Briefing N°70, 3 March 2010.

Madagascar: sortir du cycle de crises, Africa Report N°156, 18 March 2010.

Madagascar: la crise à un tournant critique?, Africa Report N°166, 18 November 2010.

Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another Dead End, Africa Report N°173, 27 April 2011.

Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe's Stalled Reform Agenda, Africa Briefing N°82, 16 November 2011.

West Africa

Côte d'Ivoire: Ensuring Credible Elections, Africa Report N°139, 22 April 2008 (only available in French).

Guinea: Ensuring Democratic Reforms, Africa Briefing N°52, 24 June 2008 (also available in French).

Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State, Africa Report N°142, 2 July 2008 (also available in French).

Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform?, Africa Report N°143, 31 July 2008.

Nigeria: Ogoni Land after Shell, Africa Briefing N°54, 18 September 2008.

Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, Africa Report N°148, 13 January 2009.

Guinea-Bissau: Building a Real Stability Pact, Africa Briefing N°57, 29 January 2009 (also available in French).

Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, Africa Briefing N°58, 5 March 2009 (also available in French).

Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, Africa Briefing N°60, 30 April 2009.

Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun, Africa Briefing N°61, 25 June 2009 (also available in Portuguese).

Côte d'Ivoire: What's Needed to End the Crisis, Africa Briefing N°62, 2 July 2009 (also available in French).

Guinea: Military Rule Must End, Africa Briefing N°66, 16 October 2009 (also available in French).

Côte d'Ivoire: sécuriser le processus électoral, Africa Report N°158, 5 May 2010.

Cameroon: Fragile State?, Africa Report N°160, 25 May 2010 (also available in French).

Cameroon: The Dangers of a Fracturing Regime, Africa Report N°161, 24 June 2010 (also available in French).

Guinea: Reforming the Army, Africa Report N°164, 23 September 2010 (also available in French).

Côte d'Ivoire: Sortir enfin de l'ornière?, Africa Briefing N°77, 25 November 2010.

Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Africa Report N°168, 20 December 2010.

Nigeria's Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?, Africa Briefing N°79, 24 February 2011.

Côte d'Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?, Africa Report N°171, 3 March 2011 (also available in French).

A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Côte d'Ivoire, Africa Report N°176, 1 August 2011 (also available in French).

Liberia How Sustainable Is the Recovery, Africa Report N°177, 19 August 2011.

Guinea: Putting the Transition Back on Track, Africa Report N°178, 23 September 2011.

APPENDIX K

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

CHAIR

Thomas R Pickering

Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria; Vice Chairman of Hills & Company

PRESIDENT & CEO

Louise Arbour

Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Morton Abramowitz

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey

Cheryl Carolus

Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC

Maria Livanos Cattau

Member of the Board, Petroplus Holdings, Switzerland

Yoichi Funabashi

Former Editor in Chief, *The Asahi Shimbun*, Japan

Frank Giustra

President & CEO, Fiore Capital

Ghassan Salamé

Dean, Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po

George Soros

Chairman, Open Society Institute

Pär Stenbäck

Former Foreign Minister of Finland

OTHER BOARD MEMBERS

Adnan Abu-Odeh

Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein, and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN

Kenneth Adelman

Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Kofi Annan

Former Secretary-General of the United Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001)

Nahum Barnea

Chief Columnist for *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Israel

Samuel Berger

Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC; Former U.S. National Security Advisor

Emma Bonino

Vice President of the Senate; Former Minister of International Trade and European Affairs of Italy and European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid

Wesley Clark

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Sheila Coronel

Toni Stabile, Professor of Practice in Investigative Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S.

Jan Egeland

Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, United Nations

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen

Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gareth Evans

President Emeritus of Crisis Group; Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Australia

Mark Eyskens

Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Joshua Fink

CEO & Chief Investment Officer, Enso Capital Management LLC

Joschka Fischer

Former Foreign Minister of Germany

Jean-Marie Guéhenno

Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Carla Hills

Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative

Lena Hjelm-Wallén

Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Sweden

Swanee Hunt

Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria; Chair, Institute for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt Alternatives Fund

Mo Ibrahim

Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel International

Igor Ivanov

Former Foreign Affairs Minister of the Russian Federation

Asma Jahangir

President of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief

Wim Kok

Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands

Ricardo Lagos

Former President of Chile

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman

Former International Secretary of International PEN; Novelist and journalist, U.S.

Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown

Former Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Deputy Secretary-General

Lalit Mansingh

Former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador to the U.S. and High Commissioner to the UK

Jessica Tuchman Mathews

President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, U.S.

Benjamin Mkapa

Former President of Tanzania

Moisés Naím

Senior Associate, International Economics Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy

Ayo Obe

Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria

Paul Reynolds

President & Chief Executive Officer, Canaccord Financial Inc.; Vice Chair, Global Head of Canaccord Genuity

Güler Sabancı

Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey

Javier Solana

Former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, NATO Secretary-General and Foreign Affairs Minister of Spain

Lawrence Summers

Former Director of the US National Economic Council and Secretary of the US Treasury; President Emeritus of Harvard University

PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL

A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.

Mala Gaonkar	George Landegger	Ian Telfer
Frank Holmes	Ford Nicholson & Lisa Wolverton	White & Case LLP
Steve Killelea	Harry Pokrandt	Neil Woodyer

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Group's efforts to prevent deadly conflict.

APCO Worldwide Inc.	Seth & Jane Ginns	Jean Manas & Rebecca Haile	Shell
Ed Bachrach	Rita E. Hauser	McKinsey & Company	Statoil Belinda Stronach
Stanley Bergman & Edward Bergman	Sir Joseph Hotung	Harriet Mouchly-Weiss	Talisman Energy
Harry Bookey & Pamela Bass-Bookey	Iara Lee & George Gund III Foundation	Näringslivets Internationella Råd (NIR) – International Council of Swedish Industry	Tilleke & Gibbins
Chevron	George Kellner	Griff Norquist	Kevin Torudag
Neil & Sandra DeFeo Family Foundation	Amed Khan	Yves Oltramare	VIVA Trust
Equinox Partners	Faisel Khan	Ana Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey R. Hoguet	Yapı Merkezi Construction and Industry Inc.
Fares I. Fares	Zelmira Koch Polk	Kerry Propper	Stelios S. Zavvos
Neemat Frem	Elliott Kulick	Michael L. Riordan	
	Liquidnet		

SENIOR ADVISERS

Former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).

Martti Ahtisaari Chairman Emeritus	Mong Joon Chung	Timothy Ong	Grigory Yavlinski
George Mitchell Chairman Emeritus	Pat Cox	Olara Otunnu	Uta Zapf
HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal	Gianfranco Dell'Alba	Lord (Christopher) Patten	Ernesto Zedillo
Hushang Ansary	Jacques Delors	Shimon Peres	
Óscar Arias	Alain Destexhe	Victor Pinchuk	
Ersin Arioglu	Mou-Shih Ding	Surin Pitsuwan	
Richard Armitage	Gernot Erler	Cyril Ramaphosa	
Diego Arria	Marika Fahlén	Fidel V. Ramos	
Zainab Bangura	Stanley Fischer	George Robertson	
Shlomo Ben-Ami	Malcolm Fraser	Michel Rocard	
Christoph Bertram	I.K. Gujral	Volker Rühe	
Alan Blinks	Max Jakobson	Mohamed Sahnoun	
Lakhdar Brahimi	James V. Kimsey	Salim A. Salim	
Zbigniew Brzezinski	Aleksander Kwasniewski	Douglas Schoen	
Kim Campbell	Todung Mulya Lubis	Christian Schwarz-Schilling	
Jorge Castañeda	Allan J. MacEachen	Michael Sohlman	
Nareh Chandra	Graça Machel	Thorvald Stoltenberg	
Eugene Chien	Nobuo Matsunaga	Leo Tindemans	
Joaquim Alberto Chissano	Barbara McDougall	Ed van Thijn	
Victor Chu	Matthew McHugh	Simone Veil	
	Miklós Németh	Shirley Williams	
	Christine Ockrent		